

Technical Memorandum ORO-T-18 (FEC)

USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IN KOREA

by

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THIS ABSTRACT IS OF A WORKING PAPER

Presenting the considered results of study by the ORO staff members responsible for its preparation. The findings and analysis are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM *assigned*

The object of this study is to determine how the infantryman used his ~~T-O&E~~ weapons in Korea; what difficulties he experienced either because of the characteristics of the weapon itself or because he was insufficiently or improperly trained; and what load of clothing and equipment he carried. *The conditions are what or conditions were to be determined by the men interviewed were interviewed in the field during their stay.*

BACKGROUND *average of 6 months of combat in Korea*

Previous interviewing in Japan of infantrymen just back from combat in Korea proved that men in groups of four to six could give an accurate account of what equipment and clothing they discarded in combat. Their answers tallied closely with results of a similar study made by interviewing officers at division headquarters in Korea.¹ It was decided therefore to use the same interviewing technique to obtain information on how men actually used their weapons in combat and what difficulties they experienced.

DISCUSSION

In the classification from private to master sergeant, 636 enlisted soldiers, with average combat service in Korea of 6.7 months, representing every regiment in Korea were asked in groups of four to six to discuss what happened to them, their clothing, equipment, and weapons. Interviews were conducted at Camp Drake Replacement and Training Center in Japan.

In the beginning, a basic list of questions on weapons, ammunition, and clothing was used as a check list by the interviewer and men were asked in turn to answer orally. They were encouraged to be as free in their replies as possible and point out any problems they thought were significant that had not been mentioned. In this way the original list of questions was expanded and some of the questions that were introduced when the interviews were well along will, therefore, be found to have been answered by relatively few men.

¹Infantry Clothing and Equipment in the Korean Winter [ORO-T-9(FEC)]. (SECRET)

Results of these interviews show that there is great uniformity in responses to questions asked, and all numerical estimates of such items as range of firing, load carried, etcetera, have been found to cluster around a central point with comparatively little scattering. Thus it is felt that results are reliable and can be fairly said to represent what the infantryman believed he did. The fact that these were group interviews further increased the reliability of the results, since any apparent exaggeration by one man was quickly picked up and questioned by others. In this way the men themselves provided a check on the accuracy of their answers.²

CONCLUSIONS

The Infantryman's Load

1. Some of the clothing and equipment issued infantrymen in Korea proved non-essential and was either turned in or discarded by the soldier to increase his mobility and fighting power. This resulted in an average reduction in weight of individual clothing and equipment from 75 to 41 lb.

2. The average weight of clothing and equipment, plus weapons and ammunition actually carried by infantrymen in various jobs, was between 62 and 95 lb.

The M-1 Rifle

3. The M-1 rifle was most often fired at ranges less than 300 yd, both in the offensive and in the defensive. It was also fired most often in daytime offensive fighting at unseen targets without using sights and, in daytime defensive fighting at seen targets using sights. At night very few targets were seen and sights were practically never used. In combat the sling was never used, and elevation and windage adjustments were very rarely made, "Kentucky" windage being relief on almost exclusively.

4. M-1 rifle sights proved deficient in that the peep sights were difficult to keep clean and use in the rain and, on some rifles, the rear sight had a tendency to looseⁿ while the front sight would sometimes break off entirely.

5. Zeroing or test firing the M-1 in the combat area was not generally done.

6. The automatic loading feature of the M-1 tended to malfunction, probably because of the rifleman's failure to maintain his weapon properly.

7. A total of 1,354 M-1 rifles were used by 334 men during their combat service in Korea.

² When this study was completed, J. D. Kaye went to Korea with the results and questioned ten officers in each of three different divisions. Dr. Kaye concludes that: "the results of this survey agree on the whole very closely with the results of the Camp Drake survey and this would suggest that any conclusions reached as a result of that survey are likely to be accurate and may be acted on." Appendix B includes Dr. Kaye's findings.

8. A sturdy cleaning rod attached to the rifle was considered necessary.

9. The noise caused by releasing the safety on the M-1 was loud enough to alert the enemy in some situations.

10. The noise caused by ejection of the empty clip from the M-1, despite the fact that at close range it could be heard by the enemy, was considered valuable by the rifleman as a signal to reload.

11. In cold weather the M-1 was difficult to reload when the issue mitten was worn. If the mitten was removed to facilitate reloading, the hand quickly became numb.

Ammunition

12. The rifleman in Korea normally carried 144-196 rounds for his weapon.

13. Little use was made of tracer ammunition.

14. The web cartridge belt and the bandoleer used by the rifleman to carry ammunition had serious deficiencies. They were both uncomfortable. Ammunition in the cartridge belt got bent and wet and much ammunition dropped out of the bandoleer.

Grenades

15. The infantryman normally carried from three to four grenades.

16. White phosphorous grenades were carried less frequently than the fragmentation type either because men feared a WP wound from accidental detonation, or because they believed the WP grenades to be less effective.

17. The noise caused by pulling the pin on a grenade was considered undesirable as it might warn the enemy that a grenade was to be thrown.

18. The issue of mixed grenades having different fuzes ("pop" and silent types, long and short burning times) caused confusion. One standard type of fuze was desired.

19. Rifle grenades were rarely used.

The Bayonet

20. The bayonet was used extensively.

21. Most of the men interviewed reported a lack of basic bayonet training.

The Browning Automatic Rifle

22. Most BAR men discarded the bipod.

23. Most rifle squads increased their firepower by employing at least two BARs.

24. A twelve-man squad with two BARs was considered a better organization than the present one because of the increased firepower.

25. The BAR was difficult to keep clean and had a high malfunction rate, particularly in winter and wet weather.

26. There was a high loss rate in BAR magazines.

The Light Machine Gun

27. There was a trend to increase the firepower of the rifle platoon by adding a second LMG.

28. The traversing mechanism on the A4 LMG was usually either left loose or removed altogether.

29. Men felt they should be trained in firing the A4 LMG from the hip when circumstances do not permit use of the tripod.

The 3.5 Rocket Launcher

30. Many units did not carry the 3.5 Rocket Launcher in the attack during the phase of the war when enemy armor was absent, but substituted a BAR or an LMG. Those units that did carry the rocket launcher seldom used it unless armor appeared.

Recoilless Rifles

31. The 57-mm Recoilless Rifle was habitually carried in the attack and was frequently used. Twelve to eighteen rounds per gun were carried.

32. The primary objection to the 57-mm RR was that it tended to draw enemy fire because of its back flash.

Training

33. Riflemen felt they had been adequately trained in the use of their weapons whereas men who operated crew-served weapons did not feel adequately trained.

34. Platoon and squad leaders felt their training had been adequate.

35. Most men felt that the infantryman must be trained to operate all infantry weapons.

36. On the average, one man per squad did not give his full support in accomplishing the squad mission.

37. Men were not sufficiently informed of the combat situation prior to an attack.

38. A need for more night training was reported.

Enemy Weapons

39. The enemy weapon most feared by our troops was the 120-mm mortar.

RECOMMENDATION

The Infantryman's Load

1. A detailed study should be made to determine the minimum weight of clothing and equipment essential to sustain a man in combat.

This should be done not only from the standpoint of reducing the soldier's load, but also of effecting economies by eliminating non-essential items from issue.

The M-1 Rifle

2. In addition to the peep sight, the rifle should have an open sight which is adequate for ranges up 300 yd, which will facilitate picking up targets, applying "Kentucky" windage and sighting in the rain, and which will be easy to keep clean.

3. The fact that men in combat did not use the rifle exactly as they are taught in training should be noted with a view to making rifle marksmanship training more realistic.

4. Commanders should insist that weapons be zeroed and test fired whenever feasible to insure accuracy and dependability.

5. A sturdy cleaning rod that can be carried attached to the rifle should be developed.

6. The safety on the M-1 should be modified so that it does not make a loud click when it is moved to fire position.

7. Development of new rifles and modifications of the M-1 should take into account difficulties in loading and firing when mittens are worn.

Ammunition

8. The value of tracer ammunition for target designation should be emphasized in training.

9. The cartridge belt and the bandoleer should be redesigned to hold the rifleman's ammunition more satisfactorily.

Grenades

10. A suitable device for carrying two to four grenades on the person should be developed.

11. Fear of accidents with the white phosphorous grenade should be dispelled by thorough training.

12. The pin on the grenade should be modified so that it does not make a noise while being removed.

13. One standard fuze should be used for all grenades.

14. The value of the new rifle grenade against armor and bunkers should be stressed in training.

Bayonet

15. Increased bayonet training is needed.

Browning Automatic Rifle

16. Training in the BAR should include work without the bipod.

17. Consideration should be given to the reorganization of the rifle squad to increase its firepower, cohesion, ease of control, and ability to absorb casualties.

18. A more dependable and lighter weapon should be developed to replace the BAR.

19. Study should be made of the BAR magazine to determine if a cheap substitute can be developed that is expendable.

Light Machine Gun

20. Consideration should be given to increasing the firepower of the rifle platoon by adding a second LMG.

The 3.5 Rocket Launcher

21. The value of the 3.5 Rocket Launcher against bunkers as well as armor should be stressed in training.

Recoilless Rifles

22. The necessity for using alternate positions for the 57-mm RR should be stressed in training.

Training (see also training recommendations under preceding headings)

23. More emphasis should be placed on training men to operate crew-served weapons.

24. Commanders at all echelons should take every precaution to ensure that replacements are properly integrated into units being exposed to combat.

25. Small unit leaders must be trained to recognize individuals who are hanging back in an attack and to take prompt corrective action.

26. Commanders must continually emphasize to their small unit leaders the value of keeping their men informed, especially prior to an attack.

27. More emphasis should be placed on night training.

USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS AND
EQUIPMENT IN KOREA

INTRODUCTION

Has the infantryman been properly equipped and trained for fighting in Korea, or has he been handicapped by insufficient training, cumbersome clothing, useless equipment, and weapons that either functioned poorly or were too few in number to do the job?

As explained in the summary, six hundred and thirty-six enlisted soldiers, representing every regiment in Korea, were asked in small groups to discuss what happened to them, their clothing, equipment, and weapons. Interviews were conducted at Camp Drake Replacement and Training Center in Japan. Half the men had come from the front lines in Korea but a few days before and were returning home on rotation; the other half were going back to Korea following hospitalization in Japan. Their average service in Korea was 6.7 months and every job in the rifle company from rifleman to platoon sergeant was represented.³

The opinions of the infantryman about his clothing, weapons, and equipment should not be ignored. The results of these interviews show that there is great uniformity in response to the questions asked, and all numerical estimates of such items as range of firing, load carried, etcetera, were found to cluster around a central point. The fact that the interviews were conducted in groups and that, in any one group, the men represented several different regiments, served as a check on the answers given. Any apparent exaggerations of one man were quickly picked up and questioned by the rest of the group. Although the judgments of some individual infantrymen may be in error, it is felt that when a large majority of 636 men give approximately the same answer to a question, that answer can be said to represent what the combat infantryman really believes and does. The accuracy of their recall can be demonstrated by their answers to two questions. The first question, asked rather early in the interview was: "What is the largest amount of ammunition you have expended in a single firefight and when did this occur?" Much later in the interview an apparently unrelated question was asked: "Have you ever as a unit experienced a shortage of ammunition serious enough to cause a withdrawal from a position and if so when did this occur?" When a chart is plotted of the months in which men reported firing the most ammunition and the months in which they said they had experienced shortages, the two curves are found to be practically identical.⁴ It is logical to suppose that when the largest amount of ammunition is being fired ammunition shortages may result. This test is felt to be a concrete demonstration of the fact that men can recall with a high degree of accuracy answers to the type of questions put to them in these interviews.

³ For statistical information on the composition of the groups see Appendix A, Tables 1-5.
⁴ See Figure A2, Appendix A

In the beginning, a basic list of questions on weapons, ammunition, and clothing was used and men were asked to answer orally. They were encouraged to be as free in their discussion of the question as possible and to point out any other problems they thought significant. In this way, the original list of questions grew as the interviews progressed and many questions that were first introduced when the interviews were well along will be found to have been answered by a relatively few men.

THE INFANTRYMAN'S LOAD

The first thing attempted in the interviews was to get an accurate estimate of the load that the combat infantryman was carrying in Korea.⁵ The problem is most acute in winter because of the necessity for clothing men warmly enough to protect them from the freezing temperatures of Korea. The soldier leaving Camp Drake for Korea in the winter of 1950-1951 was issued a total of 75.45 lb of clothing and equipment, exclusive of his weapons and ammunition. A rifle, cartridge belt, and two bandoleers would increase this load to a total of 98 lb.

Korea is a country of rugged terrain. More than 70 percent of the total area has slopes exceeding 30 percent and steep hill after steep hill is most often the infantryman's objective.⁶

Most of the men interviewed had been in Korea the previous winter, and knew how difficult it was to fight in such a country carrying a 98 lb load. The first thing the combat infantryman did was to get rid of every single item of clothing and equipment not considered absolutely necessary for survival. Men at Camp Drake awaiting return to Korea after hospitalization in Japan were aware of this, and did not attempt to take some of the items issued them much farther than the Camp barracks. Other items, particularly extra clothing, were taken back for distribution to the men in Korea, because the desperate need for replacement of many of these items in the winter of 1950-51 was well known.

This is what 345 men reported they discarded either in Japan or Korea, or turned in to supply when they rejoined their companies.

Item	Issued, No.	Discarded, No.	Men Reporting Discards, Percent	Weight Saved (lb)
Clothing				
Overcoat, fld OD 7	1	1	74 ^a	8.75
Shoe pacs (Or combat boots)	1 pr	1 pr	100 ^a	4.75
Ski socks	6 pr	3 pr	93	0.96

^aMen were issued both shoe pacs and combat boots; all of them discarded one or the other, 52 percent discarding shoe pacs.

⁵For statistical data on load see Appendix A and ORO-T-9 (SECRET).
⁶"Korean Handbook" - Sep 1950. D.A. Office Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 Washington, D. C. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Item	Issued, No.	Discarded, No.	Men Reporting Discards, Percent	Weight Saved (lb)
Clothing (Continued)				
Underwear, ctn.	3 pr	2 pr	86	0.86
Underwear, winter	2 pr	1 pr	85	1.60
Shirt, flannel OD	2	1	96	1.13
Trousers, fld, ctn.	2 pr	1 pr	96	1.50
Trousers, wool, OD	2 pr	1 pr	96	1.69
Individual Equipment				
Bag, duffel	1	1	100	2.33
Bag, barrack	1	1	100	0.50
Can, meat	1	1	84 ^b	0.84
Knife	1	1	91	0.13
Fork	1	1	85	0.08
Pack, combat	1	1	77	1.56
Pack, cargo	1	1	95	1.75
Pins, tent	5	5	99	0.45
Pole, tent	3 sects.	3	99	1.50
Tent, shelter half	1	1	82	4.25
Total				34.63

^bKitchens as a rule carried trays.

Thus by discarding 34.63 lb of clothing and equipment, the infantryman was able to reduce his load from 75.45 to 40.82 lb, almost a 50 percent reduction. But this reduction was effected primarily so that he could increase the load of ammunition he was carrying. The following data summarize the load of weapons and ammunition that combat infantrymen report they carry on attack:

Job	Weapons	Weight, Lb	Ammunition + Grenades, Weight	Total Weight
Gunner - 3.5	3.5 & .45 automatic	17	5	22
Squad leader	M-1 & bayonet	10.5	23	33.5
Riflemen	M-1 & bayonet	10.5	23	33.5
Platoon sgt.	M-1 & bayonet	10.5	23	33.5
Gunner - LMG	A-6 MG-.45 automatic	35	7	42
BAR man	BAR	19	24	43
50 percent of BAR men also carry 2 bandoleers	BAR	19	31	50
Gunner-57-mm RR	57-mm RR & .45 automatic	47	5	52
Ammo bearer-LMG	M-2	5.5	47	52.5
Radioman ^a	M-2	5.5	10	53.5
Gunner-60-mm mortar	60-mm mortar & .45 automatic	47	7	54.4

^aRadioman also carries SCR 300 weighing 38 lb.

Total weights of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment, assuming an average weight of clothing and equipment of 40.8 lb are:

Job	Load (lb)
Gunner - 3.5	63
Squad Leader	74
Riflemen	74
Platoon sgt. (also carrying binoculars)	79
Gunner - LMG	83
BAR man	84
BAR man with 2 bandoleers	91
Gunner - 57-mm RR	93
Ammo bearer - LMG	93
Radioman	94
Gunner - 60-mm mortar	95

Since the soldier, even by discarding 35 lb of clothing and equipment, is still heavily loaded, there would seem to be no point in issuing him those items of individual equipment which he feels are unnecessary, or of giving him an overcoat or any extra clothing except socks. This supports conclusions previously reached from interviews with 300 other combat infantrymen in Japan and Korea.⁷

Individual Equipment Considered Unnecessary

Duffel bag	Combat Pack
Barrack bag	Cargo Pack
Meat can	Tent pins
Knife	Tent pole
Fork	Shelter half

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

The M-1 Rifle

Discussion of weapons during the interviews began with the M-1 rifle. In a standard infantry rifle company 72 men use the M-1 as their primary weapon.⁸

None of the 596 men questioned on the M-1 rifle reported ever having used the sling; all used only "Kentucky" windage in combat. Only 5 men of the 596 said they had ever adjusted elevation in combat.

On a daytime offensive action 85 percent of the men interviewed said they never fired their rifles at ranges greater than 300 yd. Although they felt they could state the outside range limit accurately, they found it difficult to estimate the range within which the largest volume of firing occurred since the latter varied so greatly from one situation to the next. An average estimate was believed to be less than 150 yd. In daytime defensive fighting,

⁷ See ORO-T-9(FEC) (SECRET).

⁸ For statistical data on the M-1 rifle see Appendix A.

80 percent of the men reported that the outside limit of their firing was again 300 yd. However, in nighttime defensive fighting the range shortened enormously and 96 percent of the men said it was 100 yd or less. At night, trip flares, set out at about 75 to 100 yd from the defensive perimeter, gave the warning, and the men tried to hold fire until the enemy was within grenade range.⁹




Fig. 1—Reported Range of Fire, M-1 Rifle. ●, Nighttime-Defensive; ○, Daytime-Defensive; X, Daytime-Offensive.

Eighty-seven percent of the men believed one-half or more of all the shots they fired while coming up a hill on the offensive, were directed at an area from which fire was coming, rather than aimed (using the peep sight) at a seen enemy. But even the other half of their shots that were directed at a seen target were not all precisely aimed; many men fired from the hip and many from the shoulder without stopping to take a sight picture, although the target was visible. One infantryman expressed a theory apparently held by many, that the job of the rifleman is primarily to pour out as much lead as possible to keep the enemy's head down. On daytime offensive fighting, 67 percent of the men said they aimed, on the average, only one round out of an 8-round clip.

⁹ In "Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea" by S. L. A. Marshall, ORO-T-7(EUSAK) (SECRET) p. 12 the author says that in a study of the 2d Inf Div at Kunu-ri, Nov 1950, the mean distance at which recognition occurred was between 15-50 yd at night and 50-200 yd in daylight.

In a daytime defensive fight 65 percent of the men felt that at least three-fourths of their shots were directed at a seen enemy, and that at least one-half the rounds in an 8-round clip were precisely aimed by raising the weapon to the shoulder and taking a sight picture.

At night, even with flares, moonlight, and snow, there was very little opportunity to see the enemy at all and 87 percent of the men said that all they could do was to look down the side of the barrel and fire without attempting to use the sight.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of shots fired by the rifleman in offensive and defensive fighting that are directed, but not necessarily aimed, at seen targets; Figure 3 shows the percentage of aimed shots fired; and Figure 4 illustrates the ratio of shots fired at seen targets to aimed shots for daytime fighting. It is evident that the number of shots unaimed that could have been aimed because the target was visible, is much smaller in defensive fighting than in daytime offensive fighting. From the replies it can be shown that the amount of aimed firing done by the soldier is independent of the amount of time he has spent in Korea and the amount of time he has spent on active duty in the Army.¹⁰

Data below summarize information obtained on use of the rifle:

	Offensive Fighting Daytime ^a	Defensive Fighting Daytime	Defensive Fighting Nighttime	Men Reporting, No.
Range outside limit ^b	300 yd	300 yd	100 yd	602
Seen targets, percent ^b	50 (or less)	70 (at least)	10 (or less)	602
Men not using sight, percent ^c	41	6	87	586
Men that aim from 1-4 rnds out of 8 rnd clip, percent	40	37	8	586
Men that aim more than 1/2 the clip, percent	4	56	0	586

^a Since nighttime offensive fighting was negligible no attempt was made to study it.

^b This is the view of a large majority.

^c Of the men interviewed, 34 percent said they had never used the sight at all. Defensive daytime fighting was not too common — 10 percent of the men had never fought defensively in the daytime and most of the others had done it rarely.

Of the men questioned 44 percent felt that against a moving target in the brushy country of Korea a simple open-type V sight would be faster and simpler to use than the peep sight. In addition, many felt that at night they could sometimes use an open sight, whereas they could never use the peep sight. One-third of the men also complained that the peep sight is difficult to keep clean and use in the rain; one-third had lost or broken off a

¹⁰ See Appendix A, Tables A12-A17




Fig. 2—Directed Shots Fired at Seen Enemy. ●, Nighttime-Defensive; ○, Daytime-Defensive; X, Daytime-Offensive.




Fig. 3—Percentage of Aimed Shots Fired. X, Daytime-Offensive; ○, Daytime-Defensive; ●, Nighttime-Defensive.




Fig. 4—Ratio of Shots Fired at Seen Targets, to Aimed Shots, Daytime. X, Daytime-Offensive; ○, Daytime-Defensive.

front sight, and an equal number had had trouble with the rear sight loosening up and wobbling.

According to statements from the men interviewed, the M-1 rifle has not always been dependable in combat. Two-thirds of the men said that on at least one occasion they had had to fire their rifles single shot in a firefight, and one-quarter of the men said that this happened to them at least 25 percent of the time. As a result there was a great deal of switching of rifles. A total of 1,354 rifles was reported to have been used by 445 men while in Korea. The following tabulation shows what disposition was made of these weapons:

Number of Rifles Used by 445 Men in Korea

	Rifles, No.	Percent
Mech. failures, returned to ordnance	375	28
Traded for better weapon in firefight	447	33
Combat loss	185	14
Turned in for different weapon	184	13
Left behind when hit	100	7
Kept until return to Japan	63	5
	1,354	100

Of the weapons listed above, one-third was said to have been picked up in a firefight - the soldier discarding the one he was carrying because of a malfunction. The infantryman himself was quick to blame this malfunctioning on improper cleaning, but said that since there was generally only one cleaning rod in a platoon, it was difficult to keep the rifle clean. String was thought to be a very unsatisfactory substitute since it too often broke in the barrel. A suggestion that a cleaning rod be attached to the rifle met with the enthusiastic approval of virtually every man.

One-third of the men said that they had never zeroed a weapon in Korea and one-third said that they had never test-fired their rifles either on company orders or on their own.¹¹

One other complaint about the M-1 was the noise made by the safety. Half the men had a nagging fear that some day the noise made in releasing the safety would reveal their positions to the enemy, yet only one-fourth objected to the distinctive noise the empty clip made when ejected. They were quite willing to retain the noise of the clip even though the enemy might be able to use it to advantage, because they found it a very useful signal to reload.

There was a general lack of confidence in the stopping power of the carbine. Of the men questioned, 40 percent said that if

¹¹In "Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea" by S. L. A. Marshall, ORO-T-7 (EUSAK) (SECRET) p. 16, the author says that in a study of the 2d Inf Div at Kunu-r1, Nov 1950, it was shown that companies which make a practice of testing their weapons and inspecting their pieces prior to possible engagement have the best record of successful weapons operation during battle.

they were ammunition bearers, even though the T/O & E called for a carbine, they would still get an M-1 despite the additional weight because they "didn't feel safe with a carbine." One ammunition bearer in a machine gun squad said that this was actually what he had done because he did not feel he could protect the gunner with a carbine.

M-1 Ammunition

Almost without exception every rifleman interviewed carried at least 2 bandoleers of ammunition and a full cartridge belt, a total of 144 rounds which he referred to as his "basic load," despite the fact that the basic load is defined in FM 101-10 as 48 rounds.¹² As the Figure below shows, half the men were carrying from 3 to 4 bandoleers.




Fig. 5—Bandoleers Carried by 460 Men, Offensive Fighting.

Interviews showed that this increased load of ammunition was used. At least one instance in which 2 or more bandoleers were fired in a single firefight lasting 12 hours or less was cited by 95 percent of the men, and half the men could cite an occasion lasting less than 12 hours when they fired 5 or more bandoleers (240 rounds). This ammunition can be used up in a hurry. A typical example is that reported by a man from the 8th Cav Regt who said his platoon on Hill 350 in January 1951 ran out of their basic load of 2 bandoleers and a full belt in an hour and a half and had to pull off the hill to get more ammunition. In a defensive position much more ammunition can be kept on hand and it was not too unusual in a two-man foxhole to have 12 bandoleers when expecting a heavy attack. A soldier from the 35th Regt reported that when his company was on the Lincoln Line they had orders to carry 6 bandoleers and when dug in each man had 18 bandoleers in his foxhole. In a defensive position enormous amounts of ammunition can be fired. Thus one man from the 5th Cav Regt reported that in August 1951 in a defensive position, each man in his company fired an average of 60 bandoleers during a 9 hour firefight. Another company in the regiment was bringing up the ammunition because the Korean carrying parties refused.

¹²For statistical data on ammunition see Appendix A.

Even with this increased load of ammunition, one-quarter of the men reported having been in a firefight in which their ammunition ran so low that the whole unit had to withdraw. After such an experience it was not unusual for the company commander to issue orders increasing the amount of ammunition that each rifleman was to carry. Thus one soldier from the 38th Regt said that before the May 1951 offensive each rifleman carried two bandoleers and three grenades, but in May, after his unit had been run off a hill because of lack of ammunition, each man was required to carry four bandoleers and seven grenades.

Many of the men complained that too much tracer ammunition was being issued and were convinced that using tracers day or night would immediately reveal their position to the enemy. Only 9 rifle-men of 174 questioned said they ever used tracers and all but 1 of these men used them only in the daytime. Only 50 percent of the squad leaders said they ever used tracers. A soldier from the 9th Regt said that an order in his company forbade the use of tracers in anything but the .50-cal. machine gun.

Neither the cartridge belt nor the bandoleer would seem to be a completely satisfactory means of carrying ammunition. Half the men said that, falling on the ground as often as they did, it was a real problem to keep the ammunition in the cartridge belt clean and undented. Half the men said that if there were a convenient way of carrying their canteens and ponchos, they would prefer to carry all their ammunition in bandoleers and dispense with the cartridge belt. Half the men complained that bandoleers cut into the shoulder. Some men, particularly if they were wearing more than two bandoleers, tied some around their waist. Half the men said that, when running or falling on the ground, they lost at least one clip from the bandoleer. This might have been because many of the men removed the cardboard which they said stuck to the ammunition when it got wet. With the cardboard off, the clips naturally fit much more loosely in the bandoleer and dropped out more easily.

Grenades

Two-thirds of the men reported that on an attack they normally carried three or more grenades.¹³ Figure 6 indicates the number of grenades each man reported he carried on an attack.

In a defensive position, grenades were often brought up to the foxholes by the case, and half the men said that 10 or more grenades per man were usual in a defensive position.

Grenades were widely used, as can be seen from the fact that fully half the men reported throwing at least six grenades in one or more firefights. However, only one-fourth of the men carried at least one white phosphorous grenade. One-quarter of the men said that they did not carry WP because they were too dangerous. One

¹³ For statistical data on grenades see Appendix A.

man expressed the general feeling of this group by saying he had seen what white phosphorous does: if a man gets hit with one going off accidentally, he is not going to live, whereas, if a fragmentation goes off accidentally, he has a chance. A soldier from the 187th Airborne Regt, however, said it was SOP in his outfit to carry one fragmentation and two white phosphorous grenades because the Chinese were more afraid of white phosphorous.




Fig. 6-Grenades Carried, Offensive Fighting.

Two-thirds of the men wanted a "silent" grenade. They felt that a grenade that makes a "pop" when the pin is pulled gives the enemy a chance to locate it and throw it back or crawl away from it. Furthermore, one-half the men would shorten the present fuze from 4 1/2 seconds to 3 seconds. But all the men, whether they wanted "silent" or "pop" grenades, a 3-second or 4 1/2-second fuze, stressed that the most important thing was to standardize the grenades. Having grenades with varying fuze lengths, and both "silent" and "pop," they felt was dangerous, since a soldier in the excitement of a firefight can become confused.

Men in foxholes in a defensive position will very often unbend the grenade pins in order to have the grenade ready to throw instantly.¹⁴ Some men will then throw the grenade even without a

¹⁴ S. L. A. Marshall in his study "Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea" ORO-T-7 (EUSAK) (SECRET) p. 46, reported that the 1st Mar Div in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ri area 20 Nov to 10 Dec 1950, seldom used grenades because the pins were sticking in consequence of the cold, and when troops removed their mittens to handle the grenade for any length of time, their hands became frostbitten.

suitable target rather than attempt to bend the pin back again because they are afraid it has been weakened, making the grenade too dangerous to carry.

Only one-third of the men had ever seen rifle grenades used in Korea and only 12 percent of these had seen them fired at least ten times. Various reasons were advanced for their lack of use but the general feeling seemed to be that they are inaccurate, take too long to prepare, and other weapons such as the 57-mm RR do the job much more effectively.

The Bayonet

The bayonet in Korea was not only carried but used, according to the rifleman's own account.¹⁵ Of 548 men questioned, 21 percent gave the dates on which they were in actual close-in bayonet fighting. Thus 117 men were able to report the dates and location of 148 different bayonet engagements. These engagements were spread fairly evenly over the whole period from July 1950 thru October 1951, and every division was represented to about the same extent.

Both offensive and defensive engagements were reported. For example, one man from L Co of the 27th Regt reported that his platoon was ordered to take a hill when each man had on an average only three rounds of ammunition left. There was nothing left to do but attack with bayonets and the hill was taken.

Only half the men had more than 5 hours training in use of the bayonet before landing in Korea. Twenty-six men who had been in actual bayonet engagements in Korea had never had any bayonet training. There seemed to be a pronounced feeling among the soldiers that more basic training should be given on the bayonet. Three-quarters of the men, whether they had ever used the bayonet in combat, still recommended that a soldier be given at least 30 hours of bayonet training during his basic course.

Of the 454 men questioned 7 percent recommended no bayonet training at all. Some based their objections to bayonet training on the grounds that it is artificial and movements taught are unnatural and will not be followed in combat. Others said that the American soldier will never overcome his abhorrence of the bayonet regardless of the amount of training he gets and will never use it. As one soldier put it: "I wouldn't have nerve enough to face them. I'd throw my rifle at them and run." But when in one group a soldier expressed this opinion, another man said: "I had thirty or forty hours back in basic and I think that is about right. I've only seen it happen in Korea once but it's a good thing to know and my training came back."

¹⁵For statistical data on the bayonet see Appendix A.

The Browning Automatic Rifle

Although the T/O & E calls for one BAR per nine-man squad, half the men reported that their squad had two BARs. Having been severely outnumbered on numerous occasions in Korea, the infantryman was highly in favor of automatic firepower and the BAR was one of his favorite weapons.¹⁶ A squad with 2 BARs was favored by 70 percent of the men, while 10 percent wanted 3 or 4 BARs.

Half the BAR men could cite at least one instance when they fired 400 or more rounds in a single firefight. There were even reports of more than two BARs in some squads. A soldier from the 7th Regt said that for the nine months he was in Korea, his squad had four BARs and the BAR men had no assistants. A squad from K Co of the 5th RCT was reported to have operated with five BARs from January through April 1951. One soldier from I Co of the 5th RCT insisted that during April, May and June of 1951, his squad consisted of 13 men each carrying a BAR. Another soldier from the 15th Regt said that in a defensive position in August 1951 at Chorwon his squad consisted of 13 men, each with a BAR.

Figure 7 shows the number of BARs usually carried in the rifle squads represented in these interviews.

Out of this discussion came the question of the ideal size of a squad in Korea. Two-thirds of the men felt that a 12-man squad with 2 BARs was the ideal arrangement, not too large to interfere with mobility and yet large enough to be able to take a few casualties and still cover the area assigned it. It should be noted, however, that squad leaders, platoon sergeants and their assistants, were either more dubious of their ability to control a larger squad or felt that the increased mobility of the smaller squad was more worthwhile; only one-half of these men, as compared with two-thirds of the group as a whole, favored increasing the squad to 12 men.

Many of the men who said they wanted only one BAR to a squad based their objections to an increase on the fact that the BAR in their squad was undependable. Similarly, some of the men who wanted two BARs in the squad gave as their reason the belief that one would not be functioning most of the time and the squad would actually be operating with one BAR. One-third of the men said that in the winter of 1950-51 the BAR in their squads was not operating a quarter of the time they needed it, and 20 percent of the men said that in the rainy season it was also out a quarter of the time. Many expressed the opinion that part of the difficulty in keeping the gun clean was because the bolt was left wide open exposing the chamber and the top two rounds; dirt and brambles readily got into the gun and had to be scooped out with the fingers. If the bolt would pick up the first round and stay shut, the gun would be easier to keep clean.

¹⁶For statistical data on the Browning Automatic Rifle see Appendix A.




Fig. 7—Number of BARs Carried in Regimental Rifle Squads.

As reported by 61 percent of the men, the BAR in their squads was normally operated without the bipod in order to either reduce the weight from 19.4 lb to 17 lb, or because the bipod tangled in brush, particularly in attack.

BAR men complained of the difficulty in getting empty magazines in Korea. Most men said that during a firefight it was impossible to bother putting the empty magazines back in the BAR belt. Although some tried to save them by putting the empty magazines in their blouses, most threw them on the ground as they were emptied, leaving them for the assistant to gather up later if the hill was taken. Only because magazines were so hard to get was any real effort made to recover them after a firefight. It was felt that they should be considered expendable.

The men complained too of the difficulty in knowing when the last round had been fired, with the consequent waste of time in reloading. They also operated the BAR on the medium or largest gas port and felt that the smallest gas port should be replaced with a larger one. Some BAR men suggested that a bayonet be attached to the rifle because when their ammunition ran out or the BAR jammed they were left weaponless.

The Light Machine Gun

Despite the fact that the T/O & E only calls for one .30-cal. LMG per weapons squad, half the men said that the weapons squad attached to their platoons had two.¹⁷ This again, as in the case of the BAR, is an indication of the effort in Korea to get as much automatic firepower as possible. The following figure shows the number of men reporting one, two, and three machine guns attached to their rifle platoons.

Half the machine gunners with the rifle platoons said that they took the traversing mechanism off the light machine gun because it was more of a nuisance than a help. Many gunners also disliked the shoulder stock on the A-6 and took it off, converting the gun to an A-4 machine gun on a tripod. Their objections were that the shoulder stock is too long, the bipod does not hold the gun steady, and an A-4 is more maneuverable than the A-6. One man from the 17th Regt said that in his company all the A-6s were converted to A-4s because the gunners felt that with the shoulder stock they could not turn the gun around fast enough nor depress it enough. Some gunners, however, said they preferred the A-6 because one man could carry the gun and the assistant gunner could carry ammunition instead of the tripod; also that with an A-6 there was less congestion around the gun and therefore fewer casualties.

Out of 45 machine gunners 20 said that in assault there had been occasions when they had had to fire the machine gun from

¹⁷For statistical data on the LMG see Appendix A.

the hip, either because the assistant with the tripod was lagging behind or the grade of the hill made it difficult to mount the gun. They felt that a gunner should receive basic training in firing the LMG from the hip. One gunner suggested that the A-6 be designed so that ammunition could be fed from either side; then, in firing from the hip, the ammunition would not have to cross over in front of the gunner.

Flamethrowers

Of the men questioned, 75 percent had never seen the flamethrower used in Korea and only 10 percent had seen it used more




Fig. 8—Number LMGs with Rifle Platoons.

than once.¹⁸ Over half the occasions reported were from July 1951 through October 1951. Apparently use of flamethrowers was infrequent during the first 10 months or so of the war but was increasing in the summer of 1951.

The men who had seen a flamethrower used were favorably impressed. One man from the 19th Regt reported that on 17 April, two platoons and all the automatic weapons from one company tried to take a hill that had about 75 Chinese dug in in bunkers. The 57-mm RR could not be used because there was so much brush that the gunner would have been exposed in passing it. The next day three flamethrowers were sent up the hill and it was taken with ease. A similar experience was reported by a man from the 32d Regt: 100 men were sent to take a hill and failed but when three flamethrowers were sent up by the 17th Regt, one man got a bunker and the hill was rapidly secured.

There seemed to be a lack of men trained to use flamethrowers. A squad leader from the 19 Regt said that he had never seen a portable flamethrower until he was given a five-minute briefing before taking it up the hill. One man from the 19th Regt who had never seen it used, said that, in November 1951, six men from his platoon were sent to school for instruction in its use.

The flamethrower was also reported to have been used in a defensive position. Men from both the 5th Cav and the 21st Regt described a defensive variant. In their companies, 55-gal drums of napalm, placed from 50 to 100 yd apart or in each draw, were either wired to a control switch or set off by firing a tracer into them.

The 3.5 Rocket Launcher¹⁹

Of the 518 men questioned, 40 percent said that normally the rocket launcher was not carried by their outfits when they went into an attack; instead, the 57-mm RR was used to knock out bunkers, machine gun nests, and troop concentrations. Many of the men reported that as early as September 1950 the 3.5 was left in the rear in an attack. Others, however, said that it was carried by their companies as late as January, February, or March of 1951 before it was finally discarded. A typical report came from a squad leader of the 21st Regt, who said that, in the 12 months he was in Korea, the 3.5 was left in a supply truck about 15 miles in the rear and he had never seen it fired in combat.

It would appear that the 3.5 rocket launcher was used infrequently since 75 percent of the 518 men reporting had either never seen it carried or, if it was carried, had seen it fired at the most on three occasions during their combat service. It was reported that very often an extra machine gun or an extra BAR was substituted for the 3.5 in the weapons squad.

¹⁸ For statistical data on the flamethrower see Appendix A.

¹⁹ For statistical information on the 3.5 see Appendix A.

Several bazooka men complained that the tin boxes in which the round of ammunition is packed easily could become so dented that it was impossible to extract the round. A sergeant from the Pioneer and Ammunition Battalion and a 3.5 gunner each estimated independently that approximately 25 percent of 3.5 ammunition was wasted for this reason.

Figure 9 shows the number of rocket launchers carried in an attack, as reported by the men interviewed.

Recoilless Rifles

The 57-mm RR was normally carried by most companies in attack; only 8 out of 528 men reported that it was not.²⁰ In the units represented by these 8 men additional BARs, machine guns, or the 3.5 rocket launcher were used in place of the 57.

Not only was the 57 carried by 98 percent of the companies, but it was used frequently. Only 10 percent of the men said that they had seen it fired less than 20 times and 82 percent reported that normally at least 12 rounds were carried for the gun — each ammunition bearer carrying from 4 to 6 rounds.

In general the 57-mm RR seemed to be a popular weapon with the infantrymen, although some objections to it were raised. More than one soldier said that it was too heavy to carry up the hills in Korea, and too often it was impossible to get a clear field of fire. The most frequent complaint, however, was that the back flash from one round brought in all the enemy fire and only an intrepid gunner would get out in the open to fire.

In the case of the 75-mm RR it was found that far too few men were familiar with this weapon to permit any definite conclusions. However, the comment of a sergeant with a 75-mm RR section may be worth considering. He felt that the weapon could be eliminated in Korea. Although four men in his section were charged with carrying the 75 up hill, often there was room for only two to get a grip on it. Very often the gun was not in position until too late to use it.

TRAINING

In many cases the infantryman seemed to have little confidence in his training and to have been unfamiliar with the weapons assigned him for use in combat. Of 233 men (excluding riflemen)* who were asked: "Were you reasonably familiar with the weapon that was assigned to you when you first used it in combat?", 48 percent said they had been insufficiently trained in the use of their assigned weapons.²¹

²⁰ For statistical data on the 57-mm RR see Appendix A.

²¹ For statistical information on Training, see Appendix A.




Fig. 9—Rocket Launchers Carried in Attack.

Data below summarizes all replies to this question:

Job	Men Questioned, No.	Felt Untrained, No.	Felt Untrained, Percent
Riflemen	166	9 ^a	5
BAR men	85	49	57
Light machine gunners	65	19	29
Gunner			
3.5	14	11	78
57-mm RR	19	14	73
75-mm RR	5	4	80
60-mm mortar	19	4	21
81-mm mortar	5	1	20
4.2 in. mortar	2	1	50
Asst. gunner 4.2	5	4	80
Radiomen	14	4	28
	<u>399</u>	<u>120</u>	

^aNone of the 9 riflemen who felt untrained had had infantry basic training.

The sample of infantrymen other than riflemen is so small that it would be unwise to attempt to draw any firm conclusions. The results, however, lend credibility to the report of a platoon sergeant, 38th Regt, that, in the period from February 1950 to July 1950, all 67 of the replacements received in his Heavy Weapons Co were riflemen. A 57-mm RR section leader said that in the 6 months he was in Korea only 1 of the 30 replacements received in his section had ever had any previous training on the 57-mm RR.

The great majority of NCOs felt well-trained. Only 2 out of 41 platoon sergeants and 1 out of 61 squad leaders felt poorly trained for their jobs and none of these 3 men had had infantry basic training. Of the 13 section leaders questioned, 2 said they were unfamiliar with the weapons for which they were responsible, and had had to get instructions from the field manuals and from the older, more experienced men.

The soldier himself was keenly aware of his lack of training. Everyone interviewed recommended that all infantrymen going through basic training be given sufficient experience and instruction in the use of all infantry weapons (with the possible exception of mortars) so that they could fire and disassemble any one of them. This would seem a sound recommendation in view of the fact that in the group of 483 men questioned on the number of weapons they had been assigned for use in combat, one-third had used at least two kinds. Experiences were reported as follows:

Weapons Used	Men Reporting, No.	Percent
Used only 1 weapon	270	56
Used 2 kinds of weapons	162	34
Used 3 kinds of weapons	42	9
Used 4 kinds of weapons	6	1
Used 5 kinds of weapons	3	0
	<u>483</u>	<u>100</u>

One-quarter of the men had at some time been assigned a BAR, and one-quarter a machine gun. Ten percent of the men had used a rifle and machine gun or BAR and a third weapon such as the 57-mm RR.

In view of the soldier's lack of confidence in his weapon, it is not surprising that his first experience in combat could be disastrous. Only one-quarter of the men questioned felt that all new men could give effective support their first time in combat. One-third of the men felt that 50 percent or more of the new men could not give effective support in their first engagement. Furthermore, the men stressed that these estimates were based on the assumption that the new men would be fighting alongside experienced men. For example, a squad leader related an experience to support his view that as long as new men were fighting next to experienced men only 5 percent of them would fail. He said he had received 13 replacements to take into combat as a squad. He was hit in the first firefight and all but three of the 13 new men, froze, lay on the ground, and were completely unable to fight. One of the three men was able to get the wounded squad leader back to the aid station.

All the men seemed to feel that "if a new man makes it the first 12 hours, he's o.k."; but the feeling was rather general, and many examples were cited to substantiate it, that new men take a disproportionate share of casualties, especially if they have to go into a firefight immediately on joining the company. One soldier summed up the general feeling by repeating what he said was a popular expression in Korea — "the first three days in combat a man stands a 75 percent chance of being hit, the next 90 days a 25 percent chance of becoming a casualty, and anytime he remains in combat after 90 days he again stands a 75 percent chance of being hit because he has become careless and may make himself a casualty unnecessarily."

Many instances were cited of new replacements taking an excessive number of casualties their first time in combat. One platoon sergeant from the 32d Regt said that on Hill 902 at the end of May, six men joined the company immediately before it was "banzaied" and all six became immediate casualties. Another platoon sergeant said that everyone of 27 replacements he had received became a casualty within a week. One sergeant said that when his platoon pushed off at Imjin on 22 April, it included ten men who had joined it within the previous five days. All became casualties, whereas there were only two or three casualties among the experienced men. Another soldier reported that 20 replacements were received on Hill 487 on 27 October 1951. The outfit started the offensive on 29 October and in less than a week all these replacements had become casualties. A soldier from the 38th Regt reported that his battalion commander tried to cut down the casualties among the new men by pulling them out of the line at night for their first ten days with the company.

Even if every man in the squad is experienced, however, not all the men give full support to the squad. Half the men inter-

viewed believed that in the average squad at least one man would not be fighting when he should be. One-third of the men felt that two or more men in an experienced nine-man squad failed to give support in the average offensive or defensive fight. All agreed that if a man was close to rotation he would keep his head down the whole time. As one squad leader put it: "Two weeks before rotation there's no point in sending a guy up the hill at all."

Many reasons were advanced to explain why men did not support their squads. One squad leader said: "If you're treated like trash you don't care if you ever fire a weapon." Another squad leader felt that no effort was made to fit the man and the weapon. Others said that "sometimes you are just so exhausted you just don't care." As one soldier put it: "After about six months in combat and he's had three or four major engagements, he doesn't care who wins, he just wants to quit, he's finished." But others disagreed with this: "You've been at it so long it more or less comes natural so no matter how tired you are you'll get in and pitch." Most of the men who felt that "you wouldn't find any man lying down on the job in an experienced squad," said that "you'll get the support of all the men because nobody wants to be out-classed." A great many men mentioned in this connection the importance of a good leader, saying "As long as the leader will go the men will go, if they have confidence in him."

Many believed that one of the reasons so many men failed to support their squads was that too often all the men were floundering around without any real information about the combat situation. Only one-third of the men felt that they had been given all the information they needed when going on an attack. They wanted to know who was on the left and right, the amount of support they could expect from artillery and air, the location of supply points and aid stations, and some estimate of the enemy strength. Of the men interviewed, 37 percent said that they were given some information one-quarter or less of the time. The feeling was that "a man has a lot more confidence when he knows what's going on."

Two reports were recorded from the interviews of cases in which men did not give full support. One soldier said that about Christmas of 1950, following a moderately heavy defensive fight, his platoon leader had checked all weapons on orders of the company commander. He found that all the rifles had been fired, but three had obviously not been fired very much. Another man told of an occasion when his company was down to 100 men and 1 platoon was out on patrol. Half the remaining men were on line and about half were in the warming shack when the enemy made a surprise attack. Of the 35 men in the warming shack, 8 remained and took no part in the fight even though the company was very low in ammunition, and the men on line had to fight their way out using ammunition for their rifles from the machine gun belts. Of the 8 men who remained in the shack, 2 were company runners and were not supposed to be on the line, but the other 6 men should have been.

Many of the men expressed the need for more training in night fighting since the Chinese so often attacked in darkness. Another complaint was expressed by one soldier: "You're never taught in basic that you can be shot at, too; you always just take a hill and are never run off it." He felt more lives would be saved if some basic training were given in defensive fighting.

ENEMY WEAPONS

One further question brought up while talking with the men was which enemy weapon they feared most. From the replies it would seem that the enemy 120-mm mortar is by far the weapon most feared, as shown in the data below.

Weapon	Men Reporting Weapon Reaction, No.
120-mm mortar	338
Burp gun ^a	65
Artillery	47
Land mines	12
Machine gun	8
Bren gun	3
Grenades	3
	<u>476</u>

^aThe principal objection to the burp gun was the noise it makes.

APPENDIX A

DATA ON WEAPONS,
CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

Tables, Figures, and Interview Data shown in this Appendix form the basis for the main text of this report. Information in the Appendix, following introductory tabular statistics, has been grouped according to weapons and equipment in the same order as it appears throughout the text.

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TABLE A1
UNITS REPRESENTED
BY MEN INTERVIEWED

Unit	Men, No.
<u>1st Cav Div</u>	
5th Cav Regt	48
7th Cav Regt	33
8th Cav Regt	24
16th RCN	2
	<u>107</u>
<u>2d Div</u>	
9th Regt	40
23d Regt	30
38th Regt	56
Hqs	4
	<u>130</u>
<u>3d Div</u>	
7th Regt	39
15th Regt	26
65th Regt	9
	<u>74</u>
<u>7th Div</u>	
17th Regt	38
31st Regt	19
32d Regt	24
2d Rangers	4
1st Raiders	2
	<u>87</u>
<u>24th Div</u>	
5th RCT	19
19th Regt	35
21st Regt	35
34th Regt	4
	<u>93</u>
<u>25th Div</u>	
24th Regt	43
27th Regt	37
35th Regt	28
5th Rangers	3
14th Regt	2
	<u>113</u>
<u>187th Airborne Inf Regt</u> (11th A/B Div)	25
2d Engineer Group	2
3d Engineer Group	1
13th Engineer Combat Bn	1
2d Chemical Mortar Bn	1
8th Army (Attached to 2d Div)	1
2d Raiders	1
	<u>32</u>
TOTAL EMs INTERVIEWED	636

TABLE A2
KOREAN SERVICE
EXCLUDING HOSPITAL TIME

Service, Months ^a	Men, No.
1 or less	29
2	43
3	57
4	54
5	60
6	76
7	65
8	51
9	69
10	39
11	38
12	37
13	9
14	8
15	1
	<u>636</u>

^aMedian Service is 6.7 months.




Fig. A1-Korean Service Exclusive of Hospital Time.

TABLE A3
RANK OF INTERVIEWEES

Rank	Men, No.
Private	87
Private First Class	219
Corporal	163
Sergeant	89
Sergeant First Class	59
Master Sergeant	19
	636

TABLE A4
TIME SPENT
ON ARMY ACTIVE DUTY

Time Served	Men Reporting, No.
Months	
6	5
9	71
Years	
1	123
1-1/2	51
2	54
2-1/2	23
3	78
3-1/2	29
4	44
4-1/2	22
5	18
5-1/2	10
6	18
6-1/2	8
7	13
7-1/2	8
8	14
8-1/2	6
9	12
10	4
11	8
12	3
13	1
14	4
15	4
16	1
17	1
18	1
24	1
25	1
	636

TABLE A5
PRINCIPAL JOBS HELD
WHILE IN KOREA

Job	Men Reporting, No.
Platoon Sergeant	51
Assistant Platoon Sergeants	16
Squad Leaders	78
Assistant Squad Leader	14
Platoon Runner	5
Scout	7
Rifleman	187
Bar Man	71
Assistant Bar Man	5
Squad Leader (Machine Gun Squad)	12
Machine Gunner on LMG	57
Assistant Machine Gunner	8
Ammo Bearer for Machine Gun	6
Gunner on 3.5	11
Assistant Gunner on 3.5	2
Section Leader on 57-mm RR	9
Gunner on 57-mm RR	14
Assistant Gunner on 57-mm RR	3
Ammo Bearer in 57-mm Section	2
Section Leader 75-mm RR	2
Gunner 75-mm RR	3
Section Leader 60-mm Mortars	6
Gunner 60-mm Mortars	17
Assistant Gunner 60-mm Mortars	4
Section Leader 81-mm Mortars	2
Gunner 81-mm Mortars	5
Assistant Gunner 81-mm Mortars	1
F/O 81-mm Mortars	3
Field 1st Sergeant 4.2 Mortars	1
Gunner 4.2 Mortars	3
Assistant Gunner 4.2 F/O 4.2	2
Intelligence Sergeant	2
Reconnaissance Sergeant	1
Section Leader I. & R. pltn	1
Mortar Sergeant	1
Supply Sergeant	4
Medic	3
Cook	5
Engineer	9
	636

TABLE A6
CLOTHING AUTHORIZED
FOR ISSUE^a
(Troops Assigned to Korea)

Item	Quantity	Weight, Lb
Boots, Combat	1	4.13
Belt, web waist	1	0.19
Buckle, web, waist	1	0.10
Cap, fld, cotton, OD	1	---
Cap, fld, pile, OD	1	0.38
Drawers, cotton	3	0.63
Drawers, winter	2	1.54
Glove, shell, leather	1	0.22
Glove, Inserts, Wool	2	0.26
Handkerchief	4	0.24
Jacket, fld, M-43	1	2.25
Jacket, fld, pile	1	3.25
Overcoat, fld, OD-7	1	8.75
Socks, wool, c/s	3	0.57
Socks, ski	6	1.92
Sweater, High Neck	1	0.98
Shoe-Pac	1	4.75
Shirt, flannel, OD	2	2.26
Towel, Turkish, OD	2	1.50
Trousers, fld, cotton	2	3.00
Trousers, wool, OD	2	3.38
Undershirt, cotton	3	0.66
Undershirt, winter	2	1.66
		42.62

^aSource for this Table and Table A7, Supply Memorandum No. 3, Hqs Camp Drake, APO 613, 20 Feb 1951.

TABLE A7
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
AUTHORIZED FOR ISSUE
(Troops Assigned to Korea)

Item	Quantity	Weight, Lb
Bag, duffel	1	2.33
Bag, barrack	1	0.50
Blanket, wool, OD	2	8.00
Belt, cartridge (BAR belt or pistol)	1	1.61 ^a
Canteen, M-1910	1	0.47
Can, Meat	1	0.84
Case, bag, sleeping	1	1.88
Cover, canteen	1	0.44
Cup, canteen	1	0.45
Fork, M-1926	1	0.08
Helmet, steel M-1	1	2.13
Intrenching tool, w/cover	1	n.a. ^b
Knife, M-1926	1	0.13
Liner, Helmet M-1	1	0.64
Necklace, ID Tag	1	0.04
Pack, combat M-45	1	1.56
Pack, Cargo	1	1.75
Packet, first aid	1	0.14
Packet, cal 30 M-1	6	0.84
Pocket, mag, dbl web	1	
Pins, tent, shelter	5	0.45
Pole, tent, sgl section	3	1.50
Poncho, OD	1	2.00
Poncho, First Aid Packet	1	0.31
Release, chin strap	1	0.13
Suspenders, Pack	1	0.75
Spoon, M-1926	1	0.11
Tent, shelter half	1	4.25
		32.83 ^c

^aCartridge.
^bNot available.
^cWithout intrenching tools.

TABLE A8

CLOTHING WORN IN KOREA,
WINTER 1950-51
(345 Men Reporting)

Many of these seem to be listed as a sample of only 287; hence the figures in col 4 are incorrect.

Clothing, Item	Reported Worn, No.	Reported Not Worn, No.	Not Worn, Percent
Drawers, ctn alone	72		
in addn to wool	95	120	35
Drawers, winter	225	62	18
Undershirt, ctn alone	72		
in addn to wool	95	120	35
Undershirt, winter	225	62	18
Shirt, flannel, OD	226	61	18
Sweater, high neck	185	102	30
Jacket, fld, pile	248	39	11
Jacket, fld, M-43	227	60	17
Jacket, HBT			
in addn to fld M-43	52		
instead of fld M-43	60	175	50
Overcoat, fld OD 7	31	256	74
Trousers, wool, OD	232	55	16
Trousers, fld, ctn	249	38	11
Trousers, HBT			
in addn to OD and fld	15		
instead of fld, ctn	55	253	73
instead of OD	22		
Socks, ski			
one pair	107		
two pairs	120	57	17
three pairs	3		
Socks, wool, c/s			
alone			
1 pair	42		
2 pairs	15		
in addn to ski socks		156	45
1 pair	129		
2 pairs	3		
Shoe pacs	165	180	52
Combat boots	180	165	48
Belt, web waist	345	0	0
Buckle, web waist belt	345	0	0
Cap, fld, pile, OD	323	22	6
Glove, shell leather	220		
or trigger mittens	107	18	5
Handkerchiefs	345	0	0
Towel, turkish, OD	345	0	0
Muffler, wool, OD	140	205	59.7*
Socks, ski, extra			
1 pair	73		
2 pairs	120		
3 pairs	13	129	37.7
4 pairs	10		
Socks, c/s extra			
1 pair	100		
2 pairs	98	122	35
3 pairs	25		
Underwear, ctn, extra			
1	42	196	6
2	7		
Underwear, wool, extra			
1	51		
2	1	293	85

*Some men say they had never been issued a muffler, so the high percentage reporting they didn't wear one is not necessarily an indication of how worthwhile it was yet to be.

TABLE A9

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT CARRIED
IN KOREA, WINTER 1950-51
(345 Men Reporting)

Item	Carrying, No.	Not Carrying, No.	Not Carrying, Percent
Bag, duffel	0	345	100
Bag, barrack	0	345	100
Belt, cartridge or BAR belt or Pistol Belt	0	0	0
Canteen, M-1910	343	2	99
Cover, canteen	343	2	99
Cup, canteen	339	6	98
Can, meat	55	290	84
Knife	31	314	91
Fork	45	300	87
Spoon	238	107	31
Helmet, steel M-1	173		
Helmet, liner	98	172	49
Release chin strap	92	81	
Intrenching tool	278	67	19
Pack, combat	78	267	77
Pack, cargo	16	329	95
Pouch, first aid	345	0	0
Pins, tent, shelter	4	341	99
Pole, tent, shlt sectn	3	342	99
Poncho	299	46	13
Tent, shelt half	63	282	82
Mountain sleeping bag (transportation - 134 carried - 159)	293	52	15
Wool sleeping bag and 1 blanket	36		
2 blankets	5		
Blanket only	2		
1 -	9		
2 -	2		

TABLE A10
WEAPON, AMMUNITION, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT WEIGHTS

Job	No. Reporting	Weapon	Weight	Average Ammunition	Weight	Average No. Grenades	Weight	Other	Weight	Clothing Weight	Total Weight
Platoon Sgt.	35	M-1	10.5	Cartridge belt and 3 Bandoleers	16.5	3	6.36	Binoc and Compass	5.0	40.82	79.2
Asst. Pltn Sgt.	13	M-1	10.5	Cartridge belt and 3 Bandoleers	16.5	4	8.48	Binoc and Compass	5.0	40.82	81.3
Squad leader	45	M-1	10.5	Cartridge belt and 3 Bandoleers	16.5	3	6.36			40.82	74.2
Rifleman	129	M-1	10.5	Cartridge belt and 3 Bandoleers	16.5	3	6.36			40.82	74.2
BAR Man	45	BAR	19.4	BAR belt (12 magazine) 50% - 0 Bandoleers 50% - 2 Bandoleers	18.0	3	6.36			40.82	84.6
LMG Gunner	31	LMG-A-6 and .45 Auto	32.5 and 2.44	2 Clips	7.2	3	6.36	Trench Knife	1.0	40.82	83.9
LMG Ammo Bearer	5	M-2	5.53	150 Rounds	4.9	2	4.24	2 Boxes MG Ammo	38.0	40.82	93.2
60-mm Mortar Gunner	9	60-mm Mortar and .45 Auto	45 and 2.44	3 Clips	1.15	3	6.36			40.82	95.8
3.5 Gunner	6	3.5 and .45 Auto	14.35 and 2.44	2 Clips	0.77	2	4.24			40.82	62.1
57-mm RR Gunner	5	57-mm RR and .45 Auto	44.4 and 2.44	3 Clips	1.15	2	4.24			40.82	92.9
Radioman	3	M-2	5.53	120 Rounds	4.0	3	6.36	SCR 300	38.0	40.82	94.7

TABLE A11

RANGE WITHIN WHICH
AT LEAST 95 PERCENT
OF RIFLE SHOTS ARE FIRED

Range, Yards	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0 - 25	0	0
25 - 50	3	1
50 - 75	7	1
75 - 100	60	10
100 - 150	65	11
150 - 200	132	22
200 - 250	38	6
250 - 300	219	36
300 - 350	14	2
350 - 400	36	6
400 - 450	4	1
450 - 500	18	3
500 - 550	0	0
550 - 600	2	0
600 - 700	3	1
700 - 800	1	0
	<u>602</u>	<u>100</u>
Daytime - Defensive		
0 - 25	0	0
25 - 50	8	1
50 - 75	15	2
75 - 100	68	12
100 - 150	84	15
150 - 200	130	23
200 - 250	33	6
250 - 300	117	21
300 - 350	13	2
350 - 400	32	6
400 - 450	5	1
450 - 500	46	8
500 - 550	0	0
550 - 600	3	1
600 - 700	9	2
	<u>563</u>	<u>100</u>
Nighttime - Defensive		
0 - 25	102	17
25 - 50	216	36
50 - 75	127	21
75 - 100	133	22
100 - 150	11	2
150 - 200	6	1
200 - 250	2	0
250 - 300	5	1
	<u>602</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE A12

SHOTS (NOT NECESSARILY AIMED)
DIRECTED AT AN ENEMY
ACTUALLY SEEN

Shots Fired, Percent	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
5	33	6
10	89	15
15	27	5
25	151	25
30	52	8
40	32	5
50	141	23
60	13	2
70	24	4
80	30	5
90	3	1
100	4	1
	<u>602</u>	<u>100</u>
Daytime - Defensive		
0	5	1
5	4	1
10	10	2
25	20	4
30	8	1
40	10	2
50	89	17
60	40	7
70	146	27
80	67	13
90	91	17
100	46	8
	<u>536</u>	<u>100</u>
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	20	3
1	88	14
5	152	25
10	164	27
15	11	2
25	84	14
30	16	3
40	11	2
50	36	6
60	4	1
70	1	0
80	5	1
90	4	1
100	6	1
	<u>602</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE A13

AIMED SHOTS* FIRED

Shots Aimed, No. Rounds	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0	238	41
1 out of 100	5	1
1 out of 50	24	4
1 out of 24	32	6
1 out of 16	25	4
1 out of 8	80	13
2 out of 8	87	15
3 out of 8	43	7
4 out of 8	29	5
5 out of 8	15	3
6 out of 8	2	0
7 out of 8	2	0
8 out of 8	4	1
	<u>586</u>	<u>100</u>
Daytime - Defensive		
0	34	6
1 out of 24	6	1
1 out of 8	29	5
2 out of 8	24	5
3 out of 8	36	7
4 out of 8	106	20
5 out of 8	101	19
6 out of 8	88	17
7 out of 8	48	9
8 out of 8	60	11
	<u>532</u>	<u>100</u>
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	509	87
1 out of 100	8	2
1 out of 24	18	3
1 out of 16	1	0
1 out of 8	19	3
2 out of 8	20	3
3 out of 8	9	2
4 out of 8	1	0
5 out of 8	1	0
6 out of 8	0	0
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	0	0
	<u>586</u>	<u>100</u>

*A shot is considered aimed only if the sight is used.

TABLE A14

AIMED SHOTS FIRED
BY MEN WITH 1 YEAR OR
LESS ARMY SERVICE

Shots Aimed, No. Rounds	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0	71	45
1 out of 24	9	6
1 out of 16	8	5
1 out of 50	2	1
1 out of 8	28	18
2 out of 8	17	11
3 out of 8	11	7
4 out of 8	4	3
5 out of 8	6	3
6 out of 8	0	0
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	1	1
	<u>157</u>	<u>100</u>
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	109	69
1 out of 24	1	1
1 out of 16	30	19
1 out of 8	3	2
2 out of 8	6	4
3 out of 8	2	1
4 out of 8	3	2
5 out of 8	3	2
6 out of 8	0	0
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	0	0
	<u>157</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE A15

AIMED SHOTS FIRED
BY MEN WITH 4-1/2 YEARS
OR MORE ARMY SERVICE

Shots Aimed, No. Rounds	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0	55	36
1 out of 50	10	7
1 out of 20	13	8
1 out of 8	28	18
2 out of 8	17	11
3 out of 8	17	11
4 out of 8	7	5
5 out of 8	3	2
6 out of 8	1	1
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	1	1
	152	100
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	131	86
1 out of 24	2	1
1 out of 16	2	1
2 out of 8	5	4
3 out of 8	7	5
4 out of 8	3	2
5 out of 8	2	1
6 out of 8	0	0
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	0	0
	152	100

TABLE A16

AIMED SHOTS FIRED
BY MEN WITH 2 MONTHS OR
LESS SERVICE IN KOREA

Shots Aimed, No. Rounds	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0	38	58
1 out of 50	0	0
1 out of 24	5	8
1 out of 16	4	6
1 out of 8	6	9
2 out of 8	6	9
3 out of 8	2	3
4 out of 8	4	6
5 out of 8	1	1
6 out of 8	0	0
7 out of 8	0	0
8 out of 8	0	0
	66	100
Daytime - Defensive		
0	2	4
1 out of 24	0	0
1 out of 8	2	4
2 out of 8	2	4
3 out of 8	9	16
4 out of 8	16	28
5 out of 8	8	14
6 out of 8	10	18
7 out of 8	3	5
8 out of 8	4	7
	56	100
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	60	90
1 out of 24	2	3
1 out of 16	1	2
1 out of 8	2	3
2 out of 8	1	2
3 out of 8	0	0
4 out of 8	0	0
	66	100

TABLE A17

AIMED SHOTS FIRED
BY MEN WITH 11 MONTHS OR
MORE SERVICE IN KOREA

Shots Aimed, No. Rounds	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Daytime - Offensive		
0	42	54
1 out of 50	0	0
1 out of 24	6	7
1 out of 16	1	1
1 out of 8	10	13
2 out of 8	12	15
3 out of 8	2	3
4 out of 8	2	3
5 out of 8	2	3
6 out of 8	1	1
	78	100
Daytime - Defensive		
0	11	16
1 out of 24	0	0
1 out of 8	2	3
2 out of 8	2	3
3 out of 8	1	1
4 out of 8	10	14
5 out of 8	13	18
6 out of 8	14	20
7 out of 8	8	11
8 out of 8	10	14
	71	100
Nighttime - Defensive		
0	74	95
1 out of 24	0	0
1 out of 16	0	0
1 out of 8	1	1
2 out of 8	2	3
3 out of 8	1	1
	78	100

Interview Conducted
on the Peep Sight

Question	Men, No.	Men, Percent
1. Do you prefer a peep sight or an open V sight?		
Peep sight	321	52
Open V	267	44
No difference	25	4
	613	100
2. Is the aperture of the peep sight too large?		
Yes	27	7
No	383	93
	410	100
3. Have you had difficulty keeping the sight clean, enough to be a serious nuisance?		
Yes	112	31
No	245	69
	357	100
4. Have you had trouble with the sights loosening or breaking off?		
Front Sight		
Yes	38	29
No	92	71
	130	100
Rear Sight		
Yes	47	36
No	83	64
	130	100
5. Are the front guards liable to cause serious confusion?		
Yes	14	5
No	275	95
	289	100

TABLE A18

FREQUENCY IN ZEROING WEAPONS

Frequency, in Months	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Once in 1	77	16
Once in 2	54	12
Once in 3	43	9
Once in 4	35	8
Once in 5	16	4
Once in 6	25	6
Once in 7	12	3
Once in 8	7	2
Once in 9	9	2
Once in 10	6	1
Once in 11	6	1
Once in 12	4	1
Once in 13	1	0
Once in 14	1	0
Never	162	35
	458	100

TABLE A19

FREQUENCY IN PICKING TARGETS AND TEST FIRING RIFLES

Frequency	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Every night before expected attack	3	1
Once a day	11	4
Three times a week	5	1
Twice a week	18	6
Once a week	47	15
Three times a month	2	1
Twice a month	25	8
Once a month	36	11
Once every two months	11	4
Once every three months	15	5
Once every four months	7	2
Once every five months	3	1
Once every six months	2	1
Never	125	40
	310	100

TABLE A20

FREQUENCY IN OPERATING M-1 BOLT BY HAND AND FIRING SINGLE SHOT

Frequency, Times Operated	Men Reporting, No.
Never	113
1	52
2	34
3	34
4	5
5	4
6	2
7	0
8	1
9	0
10	1
11	0
12	3
20	2

Percent of Time	Men Reporting, No.
5	8
10	17
25	12
30	7
40	2
50	33
75	14
80	5
3 out of 5 firefights	1
Every firefight	4
	349

TABLE A21

NUMBER OF M-1s CARRIED BY EACH MAN*

Rifles, No.	Men Reporting, No.
1 ^b	36
1 ^c	11
1 ^d	99
2	104
3	70
4	46
5	28
6	24
7	4
8	3
9	3
10	3
11	2
12	6
13	1
15	1
19	1
20	1
22	1
30	1
	445

*Total number of men interviewed (445) used 1,354 M-1 rifles.
^bKept until returned to Japan.
^cLeft behind when hit.
^dTurned in for different weapon.

TABLE A22

DISCARD RATE FOR M-1 RIFLE* PART A

Frequency, No. Times	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
0	210	53
1	73	18
2	37	10
3	23	6
4	13	3
5	9	2
6	12	3
7	5	1
8	4	1
9	0	0
10	1	0
12	4	1
15	2	1
20	2	1
	395	100

*Rifles discarded to pick up another M-1 rifle which appeared to function better.

Figure A22
Discard Rate for M-1 Rifle

PART B

Length of Service in Korea, Months	Men Reporting Picking Up Another Rifle	
	Yes	No
Less than 1	1	6
1 - 4	28	51
4 - 8	64	82
8 - 11	55	40
11 - 14	40	28
	188	207

TABLE A23

CLEANING RODS AVAILABLE IN KOREA

Cleaning Rods, No.	Men Reporting, No.
0	63
1 per company	3
2 per company	10
1 per platoon	79
2 per platoon	40
3 per platoon	3
1 per squad	46
2 per squad	4
3 per squad	4
4 per squad	11
	263

Interviews Conducted on Cleaning Rods

"Would you like a metal cleaning rod attached to the Rifle?"

	Men Reporting	Percent
Yes	258	95
No	13	5
	271	100

"If the answer is 'no' why not?"

String is satisfactory . . .	3
Metal rod would add to weight of rifle	10
	13

Interviews on the Carbine

Question	Men Reporting, No.
1. As a rifleman would you use the carbine?	
Yes	45*
No	304
	349
2. As an ammunition bearer would you use the carbine if the TO & E called for one?	
Yes	210
No	139
	349

*44 of those who said they would use it said they preferred it to the M-1 because of its lightness; one said he would use the M-2 because under adverse weather conditions it is superior to the M-1.

Interviews Conducted on Noise of the Rifle

Question	Men Reporting, No.
1. Is the safety noisy enough to be a source of serious difficulty?	
Yes	213
No	217
	430
2. Is the sound of the clip being ejected of possible help to the enemy or is it helpful to you as an indication of when to reload, or is it of no importance?	
Helpful to the enemy	85
Helpful to know when to reload, therefore retain	187
Of no importance	43
	315
3. Is the M-1 rifle difficult to load in the winter?	
Yes	117

TABLE A24

BANDOLEERS CARRIED

Full Belt + Bandoleers, No.	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Offensive Fight		
1	7	2
2	200	43
3	118	26
4	106	23
5	13	3
6	15	3
7	0	0
8	1 ^a	0
	<u>460</u>	<u>100</u>
Defensive Fight		
2	6	5
3	5	4
4	28	24
5	11	11
6	26	23
7	4	3
8	13	11
9	1	1
10	15	13
11	1	1
12	3	2
15	1	1
18	1	1
	<u>115</u>	<u>100</u>

^aThis man was with the 7th Cavalry and insisted it was a company order to carry 8 bandoleers. He said going up a hill he usually lost at least 1 bandoleer.

TABLE A25

MAXIMUM AMMUNITION FIRED FROM M-1 RIFLE^a

Bandoleers	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	1 ^b	0
1	19	5
2	49	15
3	53	16
4	54	17
5	20	6
6	29	9
7	15	5
8	34	11
9	5	2
10	14	4
11	3	1
12	4	1
13	3	1
14	1	0
15	5	2
16	1	0
17	1	0
18	2	0
19	0	0
20	6	3
24	1	0
25	3	1
27	1	0
30	2	0
	<u>326</u>	<u>100</u>

^aData taken from single firefight lasting 12 hours or less. Ammo fired by Riflemen, Squad Leaders, Platoon Sergeants, and their assistants.
^bThis man was in Korea only 2 weeks and was never in a firefight.

TABLE A26

REPORTED AMMUNITION SHORTAGES^a

Number of Times	Men Reporting, No.
Never	341
One	112
Two	7
Three	2
	<u>462</u>

^aThis refers only to a shortage severe enough to cause the whole unit to fall back.

TABLE A27

CORRELATION OF AMMUNITION SHORTAGES TO NUMBER OF BANDOLEERS FIRED^a

Month	Men Reporting Bandoleers Fired No.	Men Reporting Ammo Shortages No.
<u>1950</u>		
July	10	6
August	4	5
September	5	5
October	5	4
November	16	16
December	4	6
<u>1951</u>		
January	1	3
February	14	12
March	6	6
April	27	28
May	17	13
June	10	6
July	12	8
August	5	4
September	6	3
October	8	7
	<u>150</u>	<u>132</u>

^aTable lists only data for occasions on which 5 or more bandoleers of M-1 ammunition were reported fired. (See graphic representation of data below.)

TABLE A28

AMOUNT OF TRACER AMMUNITION USED

When Used	Tracers, No.	Men Reporting, No.
<u>Riflemen</u>		
Day	0	165
Night	0	
Day	2 per clip	2
Night	0	
Day	1 clip per bandoleer	7
Night	0	
		<u>174</u>
<u>Squad Leaders</u>		
Day	0	11
Night	0	
Day	2 per clip	4
Night	0	
Day	1 per clip	6
Night	0	
Day	2 clips per bandoleer	1
Night	0	
Day	1 clip per bandoleer	2
Night	0	
		<u>24</u>




Fig. A2—Correlation of Ammunition Shortages to Number of Bandoleers Fired.

Interviews Conducted
on the Cartridge Belt

Question	Men Reporting, No.
1. Does the cartridge belt allow the ammunition to get wet and dirty--enough to be a real problem?	Yes 158
	No 164
	322
2. Is it more difficult to get ammunition from a cartridge belt, a bandoleer, or is there no real difference? More difficult from cartridge belt More difficult from bandoleer No real difference	131
	127
	64
	322
3. Is the cartridge belt reasonably comfortable, particularly when worn with pack suspenders?	Yes 165
	No 153
	318
4. Would you wear a cartridge belt if you weren't ordered to and there were some other way of carrying canteen, poncho, etc.	Yes 153
	No 143
	296

TABLE A29

GRENADES CUSTOMARILY CARRIED
BY INFANTRY

PART A
OFFENSIVE ACTION

Grenades, No.	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	21	4
1	6	1
2	172	29
3	153	26
4	150	25
5	42	7
6	33	6
7	3	0.5
8	6	1
9	1	0
10	3	0.5
	590	100

Interviews Conducted
on the Bandoleer

Question	Men Reporting, No.
1. Do bandoleers cut into the shoulder enough to be constantly bothersome or do you get used to wearing them? Do cut You get used to them	140
	185
	325
2. Do you customarily tie any of your bandoleers around your waist?	Yes 87
	No 239
	326
3. Does the cardboard around the ammunition in the bandoleer stick to the ammunition and cause trouble when it gets wet? Yes No	66
	170
	236
4. How much ammunition do you lose from the average bandoleer? 0 1 clip/4 bandoleers 1 clip/3 bandoleers 1 clip/2 bandoleers 1 clip/1 bandoleer 2 clips/1 bandoleer 3 clips/1 bandoleer	139
	2
	6
	23
	88
	47
	14
319	

PART B

DEFENSIVE ACTION^a

Grenades, No.	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
2	4	4
3	9	8
4	6	5
5	19	16
6	11	9
7	1	1
8	8	6
9	1	1
10	13	10
12	38	30
15	3	3
17	1	1
25	8	6
	122	100

^aIn defensive foxhole position Table shows that half the men had 10 or more grenades each in their foxholes.

TABLE A30

MAXIMUM GRENADES THROWN
IN ONE ENGAGEMENT^a

Grenades, No.	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	30	11
1	1	0
2	23	8
3	27	9
4	21	7
5	19	7
6	18	6
7	10	4
8	11	4
9	2	1
10	20	7
11	1	0
12	21	7
13	1	0
14	2	1
15	19	7
16	0	0
17	3	1
18	0	0
19	0	0
20	7	2
21	0	0
22	0	0
23	1	0
24	6	2
25	20	7
26	0	0
27	1	0
28	0	0
29	0	0
30	4	2
31-34	0	0
35	3	1
36	0	0
37	2	1
40	2	1
50	6	2
60	4	2
62	1	0
	286	100

^aTable represents grenades thrown in one engagement lasting a maximum of 12 hours.

TABLE A31

NUMBER AND TYPES OF GRENADES
NORMALLY CARRIED

Fragmentation, No.	plus White Phosphorous, No.	Men Reporting, No.	Men Carrying WP, No.
0	0	30	0
0	1	1	1
0	4	1	1
1	0	3	0
1	1	3	3
1	2	4	4
2	0	86	0
2	1	22	22
2	2	9	9
3	0	51	0
3	1	27	27
3	2	9	9
4	0	76	0
4	1	9	9
4	2	3	3
5	0	11	0
5	1	6	6
5	4	1	1
6	0	12	0
6	2	2	2
7	0	1	0
8	0	2	0
9	1	1	1
10	0	1	0
		371	98 ^a

^aTotal number of men carrying white phosphorous grenades equals 26 percent.

TABLE A32
REASONS FOR NOT CARRYING
WP GRENADES

Reasons	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
In short supply and not available	57	25
Not as effective as fragmentation	64	29
Too dangerous to self	48	21
Too awkward to carry	25	11
Give position away by blowing back	8	4
Company orders were to carry fragmentation	21	9
In hot weather WP go off without pulling pin	2	1
	225	100

TABLE A33

USE OF RIFLE GRENADES

Seen in Use, No. of Times	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	285	61
1	30	6
2	37	8
3	28	6
4	12	3
5	15	3
6	1	0
7	3	1
8	1	0
9	0	0
10 or more	56	12
	468	100

Interviews Conducted
on Grenades

Question	Men Reporting, No.
1. What length fuze do you prefer?	
1-1/2 second	1
2 second	37
3 second	186
4-1/2 second	309
	533
2. Have you ever had a grenade thrown back at you?	
Yes	35
No	138
	173
3. Do you prefer a "silent" or "pop" grenade or doesn't it make any difference?	
Silent	375
Pop	74
No difference	85
	534

TABLE A34

REASONS FOR INFREQUENT USE
OF RIFLE GRENADES

Reasons	Men Reporting, No.
Inaccurate and ineffective--other weapons do better job	54
Nuisance to carry around by hand and shells heavy	20
Shells not available	13
Adapter not available	12
Too complicated to assemble	18
Too many dud's encountered	4
Hard to fire--too much recoil	6
No sights available	2
No crimped cartridges	3
Overhead clearance bad	1
	133

TABLE A35
PARTICIPATION
IN BAYONET ACTIONS^a

Engagements, No.	Men Reporting, No.
0	431
1	98
2	13
3	5
9	1
	548

^aData does not necessarily imply individual participation by the men reporting; it may signify participation with a unit in a bayonet action.

TABLE A36
MONTHS IN WHICH
BAYONET ACTIONS OCCURRED^a

Month	Men Reporting, No.
1950	
July	5
August	4
September	7
October	2
November	13
December	15
1951	
January	12
February	12
March	9
April	27
May	15
June	8
July	7
August	5
September	4
October	3
	148

^aSee Figure below for graphic representation.




Fig. A3--Months in Which Bayonet Actions Occurred.

TABLE A37

UNITS REPRESENTED BY MEN REPORTING BAYONET ACTIONS

Unit	Men Reporting, No.
<u>1st Cav Div</u>	
5th Regt	11
7th Regt	9
8th Regt	3
	<u>23</u>
<u>2d Div</u>	
9th Regt	7
23d Regt	6
38th Regt	10
	<u>23</u>
<u>3d Div</u>	
7th Regt	11
15th Regt	1
65th Regt	2
	<u>14</u>
<u>7th Div</u>	
17th Regt	2
31st Regt	2
32d Regt	6
2d Rangers	2
	<u>12</u>
<u>24th Div</u>	
5th RCT	3
19th Regt	11
21st Regt	5
	<u>19</u>
<u>25th Div</u>	
24th Regt	8
27th Regt	7
35th Regt	7
	<u>22</u>
187th RCT	3
1st Raiders	1
	<u>117</u>

TABLE A38

BAYONET TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES OR JAPAN

Hours	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	149	33
5	67	14
10	35	7
15	10	2
20	33	7
25	13	3
30	16	4
40	17	4
50	17	4
60	4	1
70	5	1
80	9	2
90	0	0
100 or more	83	18
	<u>458</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE A39

BAYONET TRAINING IN KOREA

Hours	Men Reporting, No.
0	235
2	39
5	67
10	48
15	15
20	10
25	9
30	13
40	4
50	15
60	1
70	0
80	1
90	0
100 or more	1
	<u>458</u>

TABLE A40

US BAYONET TRAINING TIME OF MEN IN ACTUAL BAYONET ACTIONS

Hours	Men Reporting, No.
0	26
5	7
10	9
15	1
20	7
25	1
30	4
40	6
50	2
60	0
70	0
80	1
90	0
100 or more	28
	<u>92</u>

TABLE A42

BASIC BAYONET TRAINING TIME RECOMMENDED BY MEN IN ACTUAL BAYONET ACTIONS

Hours	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	4	4
5	0	0
10	8	9
15	3	3
20	10	11
30	6	7
40	8	9
50	8	9
60	2	2
70	10	11
80	7	7
90	5	5
100	18	20
150	2	2
200	1	1
	<u>92</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE A41

KOREAN BAYONET TRAINING TIME OF MEN IN ACTUAL BAYONET ACTIONS

Hours	Men Reporting, No.
0	44
5	11
10	11
15	7
20	2
25	4
30	5
40	0
50	7
100 or more	1
	<u>92</u>

TABLE A43

BAYONET TRAINING TIME RECOMMENDED BY MEN HAVING NO ACTUAL BAYONET EXPERIENCE

Hours	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
0	30	8
1	4	1
5	11	3
10	29	8
15	17	5
20	61	17
25	18	5
30	33	9
40	25	7
50	42	12
60	10	3
70	20	5
80	17	5
90	6	2
100	34	9
150	5	1
	<u>362</u>	<u>100</u>




Fig. A4—Hours Bayonet Training Time Recommended.

TABLE A44

NUMBER OF BARS REPORTED IN INDIVIDUAL RIFLE SQUADS

BARS No.	Men Reporting, No.
0 ^a	3
1	242
2	243
3	23
4	3
5	1
	515

^aOne man from A Co, 23d Regt, reported that two BAR men in his squad were killed in rapid succession so the rest of the squad refused to carry the BAR. For a month there was only one BAR in the platoon.

TABLE A45

NUMBER OF BARS REPORTED AND UNITS REPRESENTED^a

Unit	0 BARS	1 BAR	2 BARS	3 BARS	4 BARS	5 BARS
1st Cav						
5th Regt	..	15	25	1
7th Regt	..	16	14	0
8th Regt	..	6	13	1
16th RCN	..	1
2d Div						
9th Regt	..	20	10
23d Regt	2	8	15	3
38th Regt	..	23	18	1
3d Div						
7th Regt	..	21	13	1	1	..
15th Regt	..	7	12	1
65th Regt	1	1	2
7th Div						
17th Regt	..	9	18	1
31st Regt	..	5	7	2
32d Regt	..	9	9	3
2d Rangers	2
24th Div						
5 RCT	..	9	9	1	..	1
19th Regt	..	17	14
21st Regt	..	13	15	3
25th Div						
24th Regt	..	25	10	4
27th Regt	..	18	11	1
35th Regt	..	12	10
14th Regt	1
5th Rangers ^a
187th RCT	..	5	13	..	2	..
34th Regt	..	2	1
2d Raiders	1

^a10-man squad; no machine guns; airborne.

TABLE A47

NUMBER OF BARS RECOMMENDED FOR NINE-MAN SQUAD

BARS per Squad, No.	Men Reporting, No.
0	6 ^a
1	109
2	418
3	55
4	6
	594

^aThese men said that in the rainy season the BAR in their squad failed to function 75 to 90 percent of the time when it was needed.

TABLE A46

MAXIMUM AMMUNITION FIRED FROM ONE BAR IN SINGLE FIREFIGHT^a

Men Reporting, No.	Magazines, No.	Rounds, No.
1	9	180
5	10	200
11	11	220
2	12	240
4	13	260
3	14	280
2	15	300
1	16	320
2	18	360
8	20	400
2	21	420
1	22	440
1	23	460
2	24	480
5	25	500
4	26	520
1	27	540
1	30	600
1	35	700
1	36	720
2	40	800
4	50	1000
1	54	1080
2	65	1300
1	70	1400
1	78	1560
69		

^aFirefights were reported lasting 12 hours or less.

TABLE A48

RELATION OF IDEAL SQUAD SIZE TO NUMBER OF BARS

Squad Size and BARS, No.	Men Reporting, No.
9-man squad with 0 BAR	3
9-man squad with 1 BAR	49
9-man squad with 2 BARS	112
9-man squad with 3 BARS	16
12-man squad with 0 BAR	3
12-man squad with 1 BAR	9
12-man squad with 2 BARS	231
12-man squad with 3 BARS	114
12-man squad with 4 BARS	40
12-man squad with 5 BARS	2
12-man squad with 6 BARS	3
	562 ^a

^aThus 69 percent of the men reporting favor a twelve-man squad in Korea.

TABLE A49

SQUAD SIZE - BARs FAVORED BY SQUAD LEADERS AND ASSISTANTS

Ideal Squad Size and BARs, No.	Men Reporting, No.
9-man squad with 1 BAR	10
9-man squad with 2 BARs	28
9-man squad with 3 BARs	3
12-man squad with 1 BAR	6
12-man squad with 2 BARs	26
12-man squad with 3 BARs	13
12-man squad with 4 BARs	4
	90

TABLE A50

TIME BAR REPORTED OUT OF ORDER

Time Out of Order, Percent	Men Reporting, No. *			
	Winter	Percent	Rainy	Percent
0	142	38	206	50
5	42	11	53	13
10	21	6	35	8
15	11	3	8	2
20	14	4	24	5
25	39	10	36	9
30	16	4	11	3
40	7	2	3	1
50	42	11	24	5
60	6	2	5	1
70	12	3	8	2
80	13	4	4	1
90	7	2	2	0
	372	100	419	100

*Some men had been in Korea for one season only and could therefore only report on how the BAR functioned when they were there.

TABLE A51

TIME BAR REPORTED OUT OF ORDER BY BAR MEN

Time Out of Order, Percent	BAR Men Reporting, No.			
	Winter	Percent	Rainy	Percent
0	26	50	38	62
5	2	4	5	8
10	3	5	2	3
20	4	8	4	7
25	6	12	4	7
50	3	5	3	5
75	6	12	4	7
80	2	4	1	1
	52	100	61	100

TABLE A52

REPORTS ON THE BAR BIPOD

Usage, Bipod	Men Reporting, No.	Men Reporting, Percent
Left on	164	30
Taken off	331	61
Taken off in the offensive only	43	9
	538	100

TABLE A53

EMPTY BAR MAGAZINES LOST IN EACH FIREFIGHT*

Magazines Lost, Percent	Men Reporting, No.		
	BAR Men	Others	Total
0	27	16	43
5	3	4	7
10	6	4	10
15	5	7	12
20	3	4	7
25	9	8	17
30	0	10	10
40	0	1	1
50	8	17	25
60	0	2	2
75	1	4	5
	62 ^b	77 ^b	139

*Table assumes that the BAR man and his assistant have 25 magazines at the start of the firefight.
^bThus 25 percent of BAR men say that one-quarter or more of the magazines are lost and 55 percent of other men report the same experience.

TABLE A54

LIGHT MACHINE GUNS REPORTED ATTACHED TO EACH RIFLE PLATOON

LMGs Used	Men Reporting, No.
0	2 ^a
1	162
2	144
3	15
	323

*One man from the 19th Regt reported that three LMGs were lost in combat in four months so that the platoon was without any at this time. A soldier from the 5th RCT reported that his platoon used nine BARs and no machine guns.

TABLE A55

LIGHT MACHINE GUNS ATTACHED TO EACH RIFLE PLATOON AND UNITS REPRESENTED

Unit	Men Reporting, No.		
	1 LMG	2 LMGs	3 LMGs
1st Cav Div			
5th Regt	11	20	1
7th Regt	8	9	..
8th Regt	4	7	..
2d Div			
9th Regt	12	8	..
23d Regt	9	5	..
38th Regt	22	10	..
3d Div			
7th Regt	9	6	1
15th Regt	6	9	..
65th Regt	0	4	..
7th Div			
17th Regt	9	10	2
31st Regt	6	4	..
32d Regt	3	4	..
1st Raiders	..	1	1
2d Rangers	1	2	..
24th Div			
5th RCT	6	5	1
19th Regt	10	4	1
21st Regt	10	7	1
25th Div			
24th Regt	14	4	3
27th Regt	9	8	1
35th Regt	5	4	1
5th Rangers	4	2	1
187th RCT	3	9	1
34th Regt	1	1	..
2d Raiders	0	1	..

TABLE A56

USEFULNESS OF THE LMG TRAVERSING MECHANISM

Responses	Machine Gunners, No.	Others, No.	Total
Useful	11	20	31
Thrown away or turned into supply	22	48	70
Left loose on the gun	9	35	44
	42	103	145

TABLE A57

AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION CARRIED FOR EACH .30-CAL LMG

Ammunition, Boxes	Machine Gunners Reporting, No.	Others Reporting, No.	Total
3	0	5	5
4	10	35	45
5	8	23	31
6	5	44	49
7	2	6	8
8	6	19	25
9	1	5	6
10	0	5	5

TABLE A58

MAXIMUM AMMUNITION FIRED FROM ONE .30-CAL LMG IN SINGLE FIREFIGHT*

Ammunition, Boxes	Machine Gunners Reporting, No.
1/2	1
2	1
3	3
4	5
5	5
6	3
7	6
8	5
9	1
10	4
11	1
12	8
13	3
14	6
15	3
16	1
17	3
18-20	0
21	1
22	1
23-26	0
27	1
35	1
41	1
82	1
85	1
	66

*Firefights reported lasted 12 hours or less.

TABLE A59

USE OF FLAMETHROWER
IN COMBAT

Times Reported Seen	Men Reporting, No.
0	354
1	47
2	24
3	11
4	3
6	2
8	1
In every attack	4
	<u>446</u>

TABLE A60

MONTHS WHEN FLAMETHROWERS
WERE USED

Month	Men Reporting, No.
<u>1950</u>	
July	1
August	0
September	8
October	2
November	2
December	1
<u>1951</u>	
January	8
February	4
March	4
April	2
May	5
June	1
July	8
August	9
September	19
October	12
	<u>85</u>




Fig. A5—Times Flamethrower was Reported Used.

TABLE A61

DIVISION USE OF THE
FLAMETHROWER

Division	Times Reported Used ^a
<u>1st Cav Div</u>	
5th Regt	13
7th Regt	25
8th Regt	0
	<u>38</u>
<u>2d Div</u>	
9th Regt	20
23d Regt	12
38th Regt	7
	<u>39</u>
<u>3d Div</u>	
7th Regt	7
15th Regt	16
65th Regt	2
	<u>25</u>
<u>7th Div</u>	
17th Regt	4
31st Regt	4
32d Regt	0
	<u>8</u>
<u>24th Div</u>	
5th RCT	11
19th Regt	5
21st Regt	7
	<u>23</u>
<u>25th Div</u>	
24th Regt	10
27th Regt	6
35th Regt	5
14th Regt	1
	<u>22</u>
187th Airborne	2
2d Chemical Mortars	1
3d Engineers	1
TOTAL	<u>160</u>

^aOmitted are the reports of four soldiers from the 23d Regt, 24th Regt, 5th RCT and 7th Cav who reported that the flamethrower was used in every attack.

TABLE A62

REPLIES TO QUESTION: "IS THE
3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHER CARRIED
ALONG IN YOUR COMPANY WHEN
GOING INTO AN ATTACK?"

Unit	Men Reporting, No.	
	Yes	No
<u>1st Cav</u>		
5th Regt	21	19
7th Regt	12	19
8th Regt	13	5
	<u>46</u>	<u>43</u>
<u>2d Div</u>		
9th Regt	20	13
23d Regt	13	13
38th Regt	25	23
	<u>58</u>	<u>49</u>
<u>3d Div</u>		
7th Regt	25	7
15th Regt	16	3
65th Regt	4	3
	<u>45</u>	<u>13</u>
<u>7th Div</u>		
17th Regt	9	24
31st Regt	13	5
32d Regt	12	7
	<u>34</u>	<u>36</u>
<u>24th Div</u>		
5th Regt	15	8
19th Regt	18	17
21st Regt	14	12
	<u>47</u>	<u>37</u>
<u>25th Div</u>		
24th Regt	26	8
27th Regt	15	13
35th Regt	9	12
14th Regt	1	0
5th Rangers	0	2
	<u>51</u>	<u>35</u>
34th Regt	2	0
187th Airborne	14	8
TOTAL	<u>297</u>	<u>221</u>

TABLE A63

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH
3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHER
WAS SEEN FIRED^a

Times Fired	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
0	96	32
1	37	13
2	21	7
3	19	6
4	8	3
5	12	4
6	9	3
7	6	2
8	4	1
9	0	0
10 or more ^b	85	29
	297	100

^aData on the 3.5 is here reported by men in companies in which the weapon was carried.
^b10 or more times fired was described by the men reporting as "a lot".

TABLE A66

AMMUNITION ROUNDS CARRIED
ON ATTACK FOR EACH 57-mm RR

Rounds, No.	Men Reporting, No.
6	5
7	6
8	12
9	1
10	1
11	0
12	0
15	38
16	8
18	4
20	28
21	23
24	1
28	4
29	1
36	4
40	1
	138

TABLE A64

REPORTS ON THE 57-mm RR

Normal Usage	Men Reporting, No.
Carried by Co	520
Not Carried by Co	8 ^a

^aThese men were from the 1st Raiders, 7th Cav, 17th Regt, 21st Regt, 24th Regt and 35th Regt (2).

TABLE A65

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH
57-mm RR WAS SEEN FIRED

Times Fired	Men Reporting, No.
More than 20	338
About 10	19
Less than 10	17
	374

TABLE A67

MAXIMUM AMMUNITION FIRED
IN ONE ENGAGEMENT USING 57-mm RR

Rounds, No.	Date Fired	Regiment of Gunner Reporting
15	July 1950	8th Cav
15	May 1951	17th Regt
15	May 1951	38th Regt
16	April 1951	38th Regt
18	September 1951	9th Regt
18	February 1951	9th Regt
18	April 1951	7th Regt
19	September 1951	7th Regt
30	June 1951	31st Regt
32	April 1951	5th RCT
40	October 1951	5th Cav
67	June 1951	23d Regt
70	May 1951	38th Regt
74	September 1951	4th Rangers
110	April 1951	27th Regt
116	March 1951	187th Airborne
(from 3 guns)	April 1951	7th Regt

TABLE A68

RESPONSES TO QUESTION:
DID YOU FEEL COMPETENT TO
OPERATE THE WEAPON
ASSIGNED YOU?

Responses	Men Reporting, No.
Riflemen	
No	9
Yes	157
BAR Men	
No	49
Yes	36
Machine gunners	
No	19
Yes	46
Assistant machine gunners	
No	3
Yes	4
3.5 gunners	
No	11
Yes	3
Assistant 3.5 gunners	
No	0
Yes	1
57-mm RR gunners	
No	14
Yes	5
Assistant 57-mm RR gunners	
No	4
Yes	1
75-mm RR gunners	
No	4
Yes	15
60-mm mortar gunners	
No	4
Yes	15
81-mm mortar gunners	
No	1
Yes	4
4.2-in. gunners	
No	1
Yes	1
Assistant 4.2-in. gunners	
No	4
Yes	1
Forward observers	
(81-mm Mortar)	
No	0
Yes	2
(4.2-in. Mortar)	
No	1
Yes	0
(Radio operators)	
No	4
Yes	10
TOTAL	419

TABLE A69

DIFFERENT KINDS OF WEAPONS
EACH MAN HAD IN KOREA

Weapon	Men Reporting, No.
1 Kind of Weapon	
M-1	139
M-1 and M-2	106
M-2	17
BAR	5
LMG	2
60-mm mortar	1
	270
2 Kinds of Weapons	
Rifle (M-1 and/or M-2) and	
BAR	75
LMG or HMG	42
LMG and/or .50-cal	10
3.5	8
57-mm RR	9
60-mm mortar	12
81-mm mortar	1
4.2	2
75-mm RR	3
	162
3 Kinds of Weapons	
Rifle (M-1 and/or M-2) plus	
BAR and LMG	27
BAR and 3.5	1
BAR and 57-mm RR	2
BAR and flamethrower	1
LMG and/or HMG and 3.5	5
LMG and 60-mm mortar	1
LMG and 81-mm mortar	1
LMG and 4.2	2
LMG and 75-mm RR	1
60-mm mortar and 57-mm RR	1
	42
4 Kinds of Weapons	
Rifle (M-1 and/or M-2) plus	
BAR, LMG and/or HMG, and 3.5	4
BAR, LMG and 57-mm RR	1
LMG, 3.5 and 57-mm RR	1
	6
5 Kinds of Weapons	
Rifle (M-1 and/or M-2) plus	
BAR, LMG, 3.5 and 75-mm RR	1
BAR, LMG, 57-mm RR, 60-mm mortar	1
LMG, 3.5, 60-mm mortar, 81-mm mortar and 75-mm RR	1
	3

TABLE A70

PERCENTAGE OF MEN
FURNISHING EFFECTIVE SUPPORT
FIRST TIME IN COMBAT

New Men Giving Effective Sup- port, Percent	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
0	5	1
10	25	5
20	14	2
25	38	8
40	11	2
50	92	18
60	11	2
70	20	4
75	60	12
80	34	7
85	6	1
90	48	9
95	27	5
100	121	24
	512	100

TABLE A71

REPORTS OF PLATOON SERGEANTS,
SQUAD LEADERS, ASSISTANTS,
ON MEN FURNISHING EFFECTIVE
SUPPORT FIRST TIME IN COMBAT

New Men Giving Effective Sup- port, Percent	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
0	1	1
10	12	9
20	6	4
25	10	8
40	3	2
50	21	16
60	2	1
70	6	4
75	14	10
80	8	6
85	1	1
90	19	14
95	9	6
100	25	18
	137	100

TABLE A72

REPORTS ON NUMBER OF MEN
NOT FIGHTING IN EXPERIENCED SQUAD

Men Not Fighting, No.	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
Offensive Action		
0	174	36
1 out of company	7	1
1 out of platoon	3	1
2 out of platoon	32	7
1 out of squad	110	23
2 out of squad	92	19
3 out of squad	40	8
4 out of squad	17	4
5 out of squad	7	1
	482	100
Defensive Action		
0	181	37
1 out of company	7	1
1 out of platoon	3	1
2 out of platoon	14	3
1 out of squad	128	26
2 out of squad	101	21
3 out of squad	30	7
4 out of squad	17	4
5 out of squad	1	0
	482	100

TABLE A73

REPORTS FROM PLATOON SERGEANTS,
SQUAD LEADERS, ASSISTANTS, ON
MEN IN EXPERIENCED SQUAD
NOT FIGHTING

Men Not Fighting, No.	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
Offensive Action		
0	44	34
1 out of company	3	2
1 out of platoon	1	1
2 out of platoon	9	7
1 out of squad	34	26
2 out of squad	23	19
3 out of squad	10	8
4 out of squad	3	2
5 out of squad	2	1
	129	100
Defensive Action		
0	51	40
1 out of company	3	2
1 out of platoon	2	1
2 out of platoon	2	1
1 out of squad	40	31
2 out of squad	19	15
3 out of squad	7	6
4 out of squad	5	4
5 out of squad	0	0
	129	100

TABLE A74

PERCENT OF TIME MEN REPORTED
BEING REASONABLY WELL INFORMED
WHEN GOING ON ATTACK

Time, Percent	Men Reporting	
	No.	Percent
100	151	30
90	23	5
80	15	3
75	38	8
60	13	3
50	54	11
40	5	1
30	8	2
25	35	7
10	47	9
0	104	21
	493	100

APPENDIX B

THE OPINION OF OFFICERS IN THE COMBAT ZONE
ON THE USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS IN KOREA

(This material is based on a report
"The Use of Infantry Weapons in
Korea", ORS/6, by J. D. Kaye, pub-
lished 12 March 1952 in FECOM).

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BACKGROUND

A short summary of the results of the Camp Drake interviews (foregoing report) was prepared and shown to a number of experienced platoon and company commanders in Korea, and discussed with them. Their views were recorded, and are analyzed in this appendix.

These opinions were collected in February 1952 and relate on the average to the previous 8 months, roughly from June 1951. There is, however, an exception: some information was collected from the 45th Div which had been in Korea only for a few weeks, so this information relates to the beginning of 1952 only. There are thus three distinct periods covered (the first by the Camp Drake survey) and any disagreement between the opinions expressed on these three periods may be due to changes introduced from time to time.

Interviews reported in this appendix were made with officers, thus differing in viewpoint with the Camp Drake survey which was made with enlisted men. It is possible that enlisted men do not always interpret what they see correctly, or that officers are not always aware of the individual man's difficulties. Officers were interviewed because it was hoped that some interpretation of the reasons behind the various facts discovered, which might not be obtained from enlisted men, could be obtained from officers.

This study was carried out in Korea because of the possibility that men's views might have changed on leaving Korea and arriving in Japan, and because there was less exercise of memory necessary if men were questioned while actually on the spot.

This study is not complete in that a full experiment to test whether differences were due to lapse of time, to different viewpoints, or to different locations was not carried out. However, agreement between the two surveys is quite close and it is usually possible to assign the appropriate reason for any differences that do occur.

PROCEDURE

Visits were made to three different divisions and ten opinions were obtained from each division. Since they were normally from different companies their opinions were taken separately.

To obtain additional information, the lower echelons down to company level were visited. To avoid undue interference with the officers normal work, units on rest were visited for preference, but an attempt was made to get at least one opinion from each regiment, whether in the line or not. When a company was visited as many platoon commanders as were available would be collected and their joint opinion taken, or else the most experienced platoon commander would be interviewed and his opinion taken. Thus only one viewpoint was taken for each company.

The units visited were:

3d Div: 7th, 15th and 65th Regt; 45th Div: 179th, 180th and 279th Regt; 2d Div.

In 2d Div it was not possible to visit lower echelons because of traffic restrictions, but officers from each of 9th, 23d and 38th Regt were interviewed at the division CP.

The officer being interviewed was given a copy of the summary of the Camp Drake Study, which he was asked to read. It was pointed out that by summarizing that study many points had been made to appear more definite than they actually were and disagreement with the summary did not necessarily mean disagreement with the Camp Drake Results. In cases of doubt reference was made to the full report of the work at Camp Drake. After reading the summary the officer was asked to comment on it point by point—not on everything, but only those points on which he was interested or had personal knowledge. As a result there are fewer than 30 answers on each point, but it is felt that those which are given are more reliable. This procedure is similar to that adopted in the original survey where the men only covered those points which interested them.

A number of other points not covered by the summary were brought up in the course of the interviews, but they will not be considered in this report.

GENERAL REACTIONS

The majority of officers showed a surprisingly high agreement with the summary. Many said they agreed completely at first sight, but subsequently a few points of difference were usually found when point-by-point consideration was given. Only 2 of 30 disagreed at first sight; 1 raised doubts about the method of collection of opinions and objected to leading questions,²² and the other said he disagreed with most of it but in considering it point by point gave answers differing very little from those who said they agreed with the summary.

There were also some differences among divisions. In particular, officers of 45th Div disagreed with many of the remarks on training since they had recently completed a very thorough training as a unit, in Japan, and had had few replacements.

RESULTS

The M-1 Rifle

Normal Firing Range and Percentage of Seen Targets. Statement: Normal firing range is 300 yd or less by day and 100 yd or less by night.

²²This is a fault of the summary rather than of the opinion survey.

Proportion of seen targets (i.e., targets actually identified) is less than 50 percent in daylight offensive fighting, at least 75 percent in daylight defensive, and less than 10 percent at night.

This statement is a very much condensed summary of the information available from the Camp Drake survey, and possibly the limits were made too wide. However, all officers agreed with this statement, except for three who thought the limits given should be reduced, for example that the normal firing range by day should be 200 yd or less.

Percentage Not Using Sights. Statement: The percentage of men not using the sights is 40 percent in daytime offensive, 6 percent in daytime defensive, and 87 percent in night fighting.

Of 16 officers who expressed opinions on this point 10 agreed completely, 3 thought one or more of the figures should be higher, and 3 lower. Two said they thought the figures correct on the whole but that they varied from time to time with the circumstances. This suggests that the figure quoted can be relied on.

Volume of Fire. Statement: Volume of fire is more important than accuracy. Of 15 replies, 5 agreed, 5 disagreed and 5 thought volume and accuracy equally important. Of the 5 agreeing one said volume was only more important in the offensive. However, nearly all of those who thought accuracy equally or more important felt that they were not getting as good aimed fire as they would like. The reason suggested for this was a lack of training in rapid aiming and firing.

Number of Men Firing. A study made in World War II showed that only about 20 percent of men fired their rifles in combat. In view of the large quantities of ammunition now being used, 6 officers (who also had experience in World War II) were asked whether there was now a higher proportion of men firing. All agreed that there was. Two said all men now fired, 2 said some were still not firing but would not venture a percentage, one said 45 percent now fired, the other said 35 percent now fired. It appears that the reluctance to fire has to some extent been overcome by the use of automatic weapons.

Difficulties with Sights. Statement: The peep sight is regarded as difficult to keep clean, difficult to use in rain, and impossible to use at night. No one had adjusted for windage, and only one percent adjusted for elevation in combat.

Of 19 views given, 7 said they had no difficulties with the sight. Twelve had difficulties of one kind or another either in using the sight at night or in rain, or in keeping clean, but usually not all together. Six of 19 would prefer a V-sight. Only 2 officers said that elevation adjustment was sometimes made, and it was usually stated that adjustment was unnecessary at the ranges used in Korea.

Damage to Sights. Statement: Thirty percent reported damage to their front sight and 36 percent damage to their rear sight.

Of 14 replies only 4 agreed that damage to sights might be as great as this. Six said some sights were damaged, but that the percentage damaged was much lower. The remaining 4 could not recall a single case of damaged sights. Damage to the rear sight was usually described as loosening after cleaning.

Zeroing and Test Firing. Statement: Thirty-five percent had never zeroed their rifles in Korea and 40 percent had never test fired.

This appears to be a case where a change has taken place. Of 21 officers expressing views at this point only 5 agreed that the number not zeroing or test firing was more than a very small fraction. However, some officers in the 2d and 3d Div said this was comparatively recent, and that a year ago they might have agreed with the figures. Some said that a general order had been issued about test firing, and since the junior officers had been responsible for carrying it out, it is felt that their present view is reliable. Thus it may now be accepted that only a small percentage of men have not zeroed or test fired.

Failure to Operate. Statement: Sixty-eight percent of men report breakdown²³ of automatic mechanism and necessity for hand operation of bolt on at least one occasion.

This was a fairly general agreement that the figure of 68 percent was reasonable over the period investigated. For the 2d and 3d Divs, 80 percent agreed; for 45 Div two-thirds agreed, but their experience is comparatively short. The reasons advanced for the high rate of failure were as follows:

3d Div: Unanimously agreed due to dirt on weapons or ammunition. Much could be avoided by better maintenance.

2d Div: About 50 percent gave the same reasons as 3d Div. The rest attribute it to oil trouble in winter, either too much or not enough.

45th Div: Have only had winter experience and nearly all attribute failure to freezing up.

Exchanging Rifle. Statement: 445 men report using a total of 1,354 rifles (roughly 3 each) during their service in Korea.

There was general agreement that changes of rifle were very frequent. Only 2 officers of 18 thought that rifles were not changed as often as stated. Some remarked that changing was habitual even in the US and some attributed it to the practice of exchanging rifles when they are in need of minor repair, which has sometimes been carried to the extreme of changing rifles to avoid cleaning.

Cleaning Rod. Statement: Most riflemen say the cleaning rod is the only satisfactory cleaning device; 95 percent would like a cleaning rod attached to the rifle.

Of 27 officers all but 2 thought each man should have a personal cleaning rod or chain. The other two thought wire was good

²³ By this we mean failure to operate rather than mechanical failure although mechanical failure is included.

enough and did no harm, but no one thought the thong alone was satisfactory. Six suggested that a chain similar to the one issued with German rifles could be a satisfactory alternative to a rod; and two did not want a rod attached to the rifle because of its additional weight. Several said that they would prefer the folding type of rod in a pouch or butt cavity in preference to a solid rod, which could be lost too easily.

Cleaning in General: Most of the officers questioned on cleaning rods stated that cleaning equipment was generally in short supply, and suggested that a cleaning kit should be provided in addition to the rod. Various items suggested for inclusion were: a brush to remove dirt from rifle and ammunition; a chamber cleaning device; and powdered graphite for use instead of oil where necessary.

Safety Mechanism. Statement: Fifty percent thought release of safety catch too noisy and liable to give away their position to the enemy.

Fifty percent of the officers thought so too. Several said the noise can be eliminated if the catch is operated slowly and carefully. One officer said his men did not use the catch when patrolling in front of the MLR.

Ammunition

Amount Carried. Statement: Ninety-eight percent of men carry at least a cartridge belt and two bandoleers.

All agreed that at least a belt and two bandoleers were being carried some saying up to five bandoleers. Nearly all were in favor of carrying as much as possible in Korea, although two officers thought that the belt and one bandoleer should be enough if expenditure were controlled better. One officer remarked that in World War II in the Pacific his men had found the belt alone sufficient.

Running out of Ammunition. Statement: Twenty-six percent of men reported having to withdraw on at least one occasion for lack of ammunition.

Only 7 of the 30 officers commented on this, and it is probable that most of the others had no experience in running short of ammunition. The 7 all said they had run out on occasion and 2 of them remarked that an infantryman could easily fire 2 bandoleers in advancing 100 yd in the assault.

Difficulty in Loading Clip. Statement: Nearly all men with winter experience complained of difficulty in loading the clip in winter.

Of the officers commenting, 18 of 19 agreed, and 10 of them thought the clip difficult to load at any time, not merely in the winter. These 10 attributed the difficulty to lack of training, tendency of rounds to slip and jam in the clip and to dirty ammunition. The other 8 attributed the winter difficulty to cold hands, unsatisfactory gloves, or cold rifles. Three said they would prefer a magazine to a clip.

Tracer. Statement: Unpopular; no one uses tracer at night and only about 50 percent of squad leaders use it in the day time.

Of 20 officers commenting 18 agreed with the statement or said tracer was not used at all. The other 2 officers insisted in using tracer although their men disliked it. Four of the 18 felt that more tracer should be issued but had not carried it into effect.

Cartridge Belt and Bandoleer: Officers were asked their preferences and objections to one or the other. The results were much the same as in the original survey among those who answered. Some said it was just a matter of personal preference and did not comment further. The following suggestions were offered.

1. A large ammunition pouch on belt, or pouch instead of bandoleers.
2. A heavier belt supported by shoulder straps, and with additional pockets on both belt and straps.
3. Bandoleers made of stiffer material so that straps will not bunch and cut into the shoulder.
4. The cartridge belt should be redesigned with bigger pockets without holes.

Grenades

Number Carried. Statement: Seventy-six percent of men carry at least 2 in action, 40 percent at least 4.

All said that grenades were very much appreciated in Korea. Nineteen officers commenting said all their men carried more than 2 grenades. Seven of the 19 said 4 or more grenades were carried.

White-Phosphorus Grenades. Statement: Only 25 percent of men carry 1 or more WP grenades.

Thirteen of 18 officers agreed with the statement, but 7 of the 13 would have carried more if the grenades had been available. Most of the others saved their WP grenades for use against bunkers or other special missions. These grenades seemed to be generally used for assault work; but one of the 5 officers who said that more than 25 percent were carrying WP grenades, also said he thought they were carrying too many. One unit never carried WP grenades now because the men became prejudiced against WP following an accidental burst.

Shorter Time Fuze. Statement: Forty-five percent of men would like a shorter time fuze. Sixteen officers commented on this, and six (i.e., 38 percent) would like a shorter time fuze or even a contact fuze. The remainder were opposed, sometimes strongly, to any change.

Noise of Striker. Statement: Seventy percent of men object to the noise of the striker being released.

Of the officers commenting about 50 percent objected to the noise, but some pointed out that the new hand grenade is comparatively noiseless so that the problem should not exist in the future.

Use of Grenade Launcher and Adapter Statement: Rifle grenades are rarely used.

Seventeen of 21 officers agreed. The other 4 said it was being used a great deal now. Seven of the 17 rarely using the launcher would use it more if the ammunition were available, and 6 others of the 17 preferred the hand grenade adapter to the launcher and would use it more if available. Only 2 said the launcher was not worth the trouble. Thus, of 21 officers, 17 either were using the launcher frequently or would use the launcher or adapter frequently if it and ammunition were available. Three said that training on the launcher was inadequate, and the majority complained that launchers, rifle grenades of all types, and hand grenade adapters of both types were in very short supply.

The Bayonet

Statement: Nearly all infantrymen want to keep the bayonet. There was a slight difference of opinion between officers of the 3d Div and the others on this point. In the 2d and 45th Divs only 1 of 15 officers thought the bayonet unnecessary. The usual reason advanced for keeping it was that it helped the morale of their troops; very few felt that the enemy were really afraid of bayonet fighting. In the 3d Div 3 of 6 officers thought it unnecessary. These 3 added that their men appeared to think the same and many had lost or discarded their bayonets. Many bayonets were damaged by improper use.

Number of Bayonet Fights. Statement: Twenty-two percent had been in a bayonet fight and 148 engagements were reported. All 45th Div officers reported no experience. In the 3d Div 2 of 8 officers thought 22 percent about right, provided it did not mean that 22 percent had actually used the bayonet themselves on the enemy. The remaining 6 thought 22 percent much too high. In the 2d Div 3 officers of 10 had known instances of bayonet fighting; the other 7 could recall no occasion on which bayonets had been used for their proper purpose.

Bayonet Training. Statement: Forty-seven percent of men had not more than 5 hours training before Korea; 33 percent had none at all. Seventy-three percent of men who had been in bayonet fights felt that at least 30 hours training should be given.

All the officers in the 45th Div said their men had been given 30 hours or more (up to 60 hours) of bayonet training, and most of them agreed that this was worthwhile. 2d and 3d Div officers replied differently but only 3 agreed with the figures quoted; the remainder thought that nearly all men had received at least 5 hours training. On the question of how much training was required these 2 divisions were about equally divided. Six officers thought 30 or more hours were needed, 7 officers thought 30 hours were too many and would use up training time which could be more usefully employed. Nearly all those in favor of bayonet training regarded it primarily as physical training rather than as preparation for bayonet fighting.

The Browning Automatic Rifle

Statement: Almost 50 percent of all squads now use 2 BARs instead of 1.

Of 22 officers questioned only 1 was not using 2 automatic rifles in any squad, but 3 officers said they had 2 in some squads only, and had not enough weapons to give all squads 2. The officer using 1 in all squads and 3 other officers said they preferred 1 BAR per squad. Five officers complained that the BAR was too heavy and complicated, although not specifically asked.

Size of Squad. Statement: Sixty-nine percent of men but only 54 percent of squad leaders favored returning to a 12-man squad.

The officers were asked directly which they preferred. Of 19 answering, 12 thought the 9-man squad big enough and 12 men too many to handle. Only 7 officers (37 percent) preferred the 12-man squad, and of these 4 at present had from 10 to 12 men in each squad. It would appear that the more responsibility a man has the less he favors the 12-man squad.

Ammunition Supply: Of 10 officers commenting on ammunition supply, 8 said it was very difficult to keep up an adequate supply of BAR ammunition, particularly when 2 BARs were used in each squad. However, none had any good idea as to how the condition could be improved. Comments were:

1. Carrying a box of LMG ammunition is not very satisfactory because rounds easily get dented and must be examined closely to avoid stoppage;

2. Although the assistant BAR man carries a rifle he has little opportunity to use it and for him one bandoleer is sufficient; he can therefore carry more BAR magazines; and

3. Magazines should be salvaged for use in emergency.

Use of Bipod. Statement: Sixty-five percent of the men remove the bipod to reduce weight.

Of 18 officers commenting, 12 disagreed and said either that all bipods were kept on, or that far less than 65 percent were removed. Of the 6 who agreed with the figures 4 were opposed to the practice, and the remaining 2 who approved wanted the bipod kept available for use in defense. All were in favor of using the bipod in defense, but many found it awkward in the attack and liable to catch in undergrowth. They felt this was the main reason it was removed, rather than to reduce weight. It was suggested that if there were some easy way of folding the bipod along the barrel in the attack very few men would remove it.

Reliability. Statement: In winter 40 percent of the men report no difficulty with BAR functioning, but 38 percent say it is out of action one-fourth of the time or more (21 percent say one-half time or more). The corresponding figures for wet weather are 50 percent no difficulty, 22 percent out of action one-fourth time or more (10 percent one-half time or more).

Of 17 officers commenting, 11 thought these percentages about right. Five thought the percentages out of action too high,

1 thought the percentage experiencing no difficulty was too high. Reasons given for the failure to function were as follows: 2 said magazine difficulty; the remainder blamed oil freezing or dirt. Some of this was avoidable being largely due to lack of training in care and maintenance.

Gasports: A question on gasports was not included but 4 officers who showed special interest in BAR functioning were asked their opinion. They all agreed that the present size of ports was satisfactory on the range, but 3 of the 4 were in favor of having a large port instead of the smaller one for operational use. The reason they gave for this was that a certain amount of clogging by dust and dirt was unavoidable, and this reduced the effective size of the hole considerably.

The Light Machine Gun

Use of Two in Squad. Statement: In the weapons squads, 49 percent have 2 or more LMGs. Fourteen of 16 officers said they were using 2 light machine guns in each weapons squad when available. The other 2 still kept to 1 per squad.

Traversing Mechanism. Statement: The traversing mechanism is only used by about 20 percent of the gunners. The remainder remove it or leave it loose on the gun.

Eleven of 17 officers agreed that the traversing mechanism was not used, but of these 4 were opposed to the practice and were trying to change it. Thus there were 10 officers of 17 who were in favor of using the traversing mechanism, particularly in the defense at night, though not necessarily so at other times. Some felt that men were not adequately trained in the proper use of the traversing mechanism.

Firing from the Hip. Statement: About 40 percent of gunners have on occasions fired from the hip, and feel that some training in hip firing should be given.

Of 14 officers, 7 said no hip firing was done, 7 said it was done although 1 of this 7 said it should be discouraged. The 6 fully in favor wanted men trained to fire from the hip and suggested that a shoulder strap or carrying handle would help to make hip firing easier.

Use of A4 or A6 Type. Statement: Many prefer the tripod of the A4 to the shoulder stock and bipod of the A6.

Of 17 officers 4 preferred the A6 outright and 3 the A4. The remainder preferred 1 or the other with reservations, the majority preferring the A6 in attack and the A4 in defense. On the whole most men like the A6 attachment provided that there is a tripod available for use in defensive positions. The disadvantage of the A4 is that one man carries the gun, another the tripod, and if they are separated the gun is comparatively useless for a time. This may account for some of the hip firing.

57-mm Recoilless Rifle

Amount of Use. Statement: Ninety-eight percent of companies carry the 57-mm in the attack and only 10 percent of men have seen it used less than 10 times.

All agreed that the 57-mm RR was always carried and used a great deal, except for 2 officers in the 45th Div who had carried it but had so far had no opportunity to use it.

Ammunition Supply. Statement: Eighty-two percent of men report that 12 or more rounds are carried for each 57-mm rifle. All gunners have on occasions fired 15 rounds or more in an engagement.

Only 1 officer said that fewer than 12 rounds were being carried for each rifle, but 4 of 11 said that their units had never fired as many as 15 rounds in 1 engagement, and their maximum was 10. One of these officers said that after 10 rounds the rifle gets clogged up with carbon and will not function until cleaned.

Attraction of Enemy Fire. Statement: The main criticism is that the 57-mm attracts enemy fire.

All 17 officers agreed that the recoilless rifle attracted enemy fire, but 1 said it was not serious, and 2 said it was no worse than for any other heavy weapon. However 1 said it attracted more fire than anything else. Six said the position of the weapon should be changed quickly after each 2 or 3 rounds, 1 said it should always be dug in before firing.

The Flamethrower

Training in Flamethrower: Men in the 2d and 3d Divs have had little training on the flamethrower. Men in the 45th Div, who were recently trained, have had a fairly thorough training in its use but one officer (of seven) thought training insufficient.

Value of Flamethrower. Statement: Most men who have seen it in use consider it very valuable in the attack.

Of 18 officers, 15 thought the flamethrower valuable in the attack, with some reservations. The other 3 thought it would be of most value in defense. Seven said the flamethrower was too heavy, 4 said it would be much more valuable if it could be refueled on the spot, e.g., by replaceable tanks; and 3 said the man carrying the flamethrower was far too vulnerable, and always attracted enemy fire.

Training

Number of Men not Familiar with their Weapons. Statement: The following percentages of personnel said they were not fully familiar with their weapon when they first used it in Korea.

Weapons	Percent	Weapons	Percent
Rifle	4	57-mm Recoilless	74
BAR	58	75-mm Recoilless	80 ^a
LMG	31	60-mm Mortar	21
3.5 Rocket		81-mm Mortar	20 ^a
Launcher	78	4.2 in. Mortar	50 ^a

^a These percentages were based on very small numbers and are not very reliable.

On the M-1 Rifle 20 of 23 officers thought that there were not more than 4 percent of men not fully trained. The other 3 thought about 10 percent to 15 percent were not familiar with the rifle (2 from 3d Div and 1 from 2d Div). Regarding the remaining weapons, 18 officers agreed with the percentage not fully familiar with their weapons, and 5 officers thought some or all the percentages were too high. Nearly all the dissenters were from 45th Div in which 5 of 7 officers thought nearly all men fully trained on all their weapons. Since 45th Div had only been in Korea a few weeks after completing thorough training as a unit this disagreement was expected. Officers of the other two div and the former 1st Cav Div officers were almost unanimous in accepting the percentages quoted. The reasons advanced for this situation were that only rifle training is fully adequate, that there is a shortage of ammunition for practice firing, that men try to get on heavy weapons even if not trained, in order to avoid the rifle squad. The BAR in particular is rather a complicated weapon, and the training schedule does not allow enough time for men to learn it thoroughly, with the result that they forget most of their instruction. Another point was that users of the heavier weapons do not get enough tactical training.

Efficiency of Squad Leaders and Platoon Sergeants. Statement: Most squad leaders and platoon sergeants felt competent to do their job.

In order to get an independent opinion a special point was made of asking officers whether they thought squad leaders and platoon sergeants were efficient. Of 26 officers, 19 agreed that they were reasonably efficient. The other 7 thought squad leaders not very good. Three of them thought platoon sergeants also were not very good. There was a marked difference between the 3d Div and the others on this point. The numbers agreeing that squad leaders and platoon sergeants were efficient are as follows:

3d Div	2 of 7
45th Div	8 of 9
2d Div	9 of 10.

Several officers remarked that leadership ability was fairly good but technical and tactical knowledge was comparatively poor. Some thought the training of non-commissioned officers concentrated too much on producing platoon sergeants, rather than squad leaders. On the whole the results confirm the non-commissioned officers' opinion of themselves.

Training on All Weapons Statement: Most men were in favor of receiving some training on all weapons.

Of 16 officers 12 thought that all infantry troops should have some training on all infantry company weapons. In particular they should fire live ammunition, so that in battle they would be able to recognize their own supporting fire and feel confidence in it. Three officers thought that men should be thoroughly trained on two or three weapons only; the rifle, one machine gun, or the BAR, and possible another weapon. The remaining officer thought

that all training other than that on the rifle should be given in the unit after the man had been assigned.

Number of types of Weapons Operated in Action. Statement: Fifty-six percent of the men had operated 1 type only, 34 percent had operated 2 types, 9 percent 3 types, and 1 percent 4 types.

Very few officers commented on this, but those that did thought the figures approximately correct.

Effectiveness of New Men. Statement: About 55 percent of NCOs and men thought at least 25 percent of new men would not be effective in their first action, and all felt that new men have the highest casualty rate.

Of 12 officers giving a definite opinion 5 thought that new men are usually effective; they have less fear than experienced men. The other 7 felt that experience was necessary before men could become fully effective (about the same percentage, 55 percent, as for NCOs and men). Other officers would not express a definite opinion, saying that it depended on circumstance; for example on how many new men were introduced at a time. However, 10 of 11 officers thought new men experienced more casualties than the others, either from rashness or inexperience.

Statement: Fifty-five percent of men felt that in each squad there was at least one man not doing his job properly.

Of 13 officers 9 agreed that there was 1 man per squad not doing his job properly. Three officers said 2 per squad, 1 said 3 per squad. Other officers said it depends on circumstances and would not commit themselves to a number.

Night Training. Statement: Many felt the need for night training.

All officers agreed that more night training should be given, although a fair amount is now being done in most units. Although agreeing, some officers felt rather doubtful how far it could be carried, and this was a feeling that only a few men could become really efficient night fighters. Many felt that men would be more confident at night if they were first made familiar with night activity in the US. The kind of training suggested included small patrols, squad and platoon training, night vision, judging distances at night, and controlling men at night.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this survey agree, on the whole, very closely with the results of the Camp Drake survey and this would suggest that any conclusions reached as a result of that survey are likely to be accurate and may be acted on.

The major differences revealed between this and the main survey may all be ascribed to outside influences such as the passage of time, and they do not imply any inaccuracy in the main survey; in fact they tend to confirm its correctness at the time.

The major differences are as follows:

1. Trends in the use of more weapons, which had started at the time of the original survey, appear to have been carried further at the time of this survey. For example, nearly all rifle squads now have 2 BARs and nearly all weapons squads now use 2 LMGs. Also all men now appear to carry 2 or more grenades.
2. More attention is now being paid to the zeroing and test firing of rifles.
3. If the experience of 45th Div can be regarded as a reliable pointer to future practice it would appear that more men are now fully trained on their weapons.

There are two points from the original survey where it is possible that there may have been some exaggeration on the part of the men interviewed. They are:

1. Percentage of sights damaged.
2. Number of bayonet actions.

There are some questions which men and officers appear to regard from a slightly different viewpoint. Some of these are:

1. Tracer, which officers appear to like more than the men.
2. LMG traversing, which some officers insist on.
3. Removal of BAR bipod, to which most officers object.
4. Efficiency of noncommissioned officers (particularly in 3d Div).

There are some facts which are acknowledged, yet most officers agree they should be changed. Chief of these are two weapons where the general desire is for a much increased use but supplies are not available. They are:

1. The white phosphorus grenade.
2. The grenade launcher or adapter.

Where NCOs favor some change less than other men, as for example in the suggested change to a 12-man squad, officers appear to favor such a change even less.